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Abstract 
There is constant demand for the development of mobile networks to meet the service 
requirements of users, and their development is a significant topic of research. The 
current fourth generation (4G) of mobile networks are expected to provide high speed 
connections anywhere at any time. Various existing 4G architectures such as LTE and 
WiMax support only wireless technologies, while an alternative architecture, Y-Comm, 
has been proposed to combine both existing wired and wireless networks. Y-Comm 
seeks to meet the main service requirements of 4G by converging the existing networks, 
so that the user can get better service anywhere and at any time.  
One of the major characteristics of Y-Comm is heterogeneity, which means that 
networks with different topologies work together to provide seamless communication to 
the end user. However, this heterogeneity leads to technical issues which may 
compromise quality of service, vertical handover and security. Due to the convergence 
characteristic of Y-Comm, security is considered more significant than in the existing 
LTE and WiMax networks. These security concerns have motivated this research study 
to propose a novel security management system. The research aims to meet the security 
requirements of 4G mobile networks, e.g. preventing end user devices from being used 
as attack tools. This requirement has not been met clearly in previous studies of Y-
Comm, but this study proposes a security management system which does this. 
This research follows the ITU-T recommendation M.3400 dealing with security 
violations within Y-Comm networks. It proposes a policy-based security management 
system to deal with events that trigger actions in the system and uses Ponder2 to 
implement it. The proposed system, located in the top layer of the Y-Comm 
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architecture, interacts with components of Y-Comm to enforce the appropriate policies. 
Its four main components are the Intelligent Agent, the Security Engine, the Security 
Policies Database and the Security Administrator. These are represented in this research 
as managed objects to meet design considerations such as extensibility and 
modifiability. 
This research demonstrates that the proposed system meets the security requirements of 
the Y-Comm environment. Its deployment is possible with managed objects built with 
Ponder2 for all of the components of Y-Comm, which means that the security 
management system is able to prevent end user devices from being used as attack tools. 
It can also achieve other security goals of Y-Comm networks. 
  
 IV 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that the work described in my thesis is original work undertaken by me for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, at the Software Technology Research Laboratory 
(STRL), De Montfort University, United Kingdom. No part of the material described in 
this thesis has been submitted for the award of any other degree or qualification in this 
or any other university or college of advanced education. 
I also declare that part of this thesis has been published in my following publications.  
  
 V 
 
 
Publications 
 
- H. Alquhayz, A. Al-Bayatti and A. Platt. "Security management system for 4G 
heterogeneous networks." In Proceedings of the World Congress on 
Engineering, vol. 2. London, UK. 2012. Certificate of Merit (Student). 
- H. Alquhayz, A. Al-Bayatti and A. Platt. "Protecting the End User Device in 4G 
Heterogeneous Networks." In IAENG Transactions on Engineering 
Technologies, pp. 339-348. Springer Netherlands, 2013. Book Chapter, 
Invited. 
  
 VI 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
First of All, I would thank Allah (God) for all his blessings, gifts, everything in my life, 
and this opportunity to do a PhD. I thank Allah for supporting me in facing the 
challenges in this life.   
I would like to thank my first supervisor, Dr. Ali Al-Bayatti, for his support, motivation, 
patience, and guidance throughout the PhD period. I would thank him for everything he 
taught me.  I learned a lot from Dr. Ali, and his support and understanding will never be 
forgotten. I ask Allah to reward him in this life and in the life hereafter. His feedback 
and comments have been a great source of inspiration for me. I really appreciate his 
great supervision and direction.  
I would also thank my previous second supervisor, Dr. Amelia Platt, for her inspiration 
and positive kind words. I want to say thank you for her support and guidance.  
My greatest thanks to my father and mother; their help, support and prayers have 
motivated me to achieve this thesis, and allowed me to achieve previous achievements 
in my life. I ask Allah to save them in this life and reward them in paradise in the life 
hereafter. I also thank my brothers and sisters for the many great things they have done 
for me. 
Also, my special thanks to my wife for her help, support and company in this country. 
Her motivational words helped me to get through the difficult times and to write this 
thesis. I love you Hind, and wish a wonderful life for us. Also, I would thank my son 
 VII 
 
who gave me a smile and a warm welcome every day. Playing with him was a recharger 
for me.    
I also wish to thanks all of the STRL staff and my colleagues. Studying at the STRL has 
been a great experience in my life. I would thank all the great friends that I made in 
STRL, especially Tareq Binjammaz and Yazeed Alsaway. Also, I would thank all my 
friends and neighbours in Leicester. I met a lot of friends here in Leicester, and our 
friendship will last for ever.  
     Thank you. 
Table of Contents 
VIII 
 
Table of Contents 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................. I 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... II 
DECLARATION .......................................................................................................... IV 
Publications ..................................................................................................................... V 
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ VI 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... VIII 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. XII 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................. XIV 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Motivation ......................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Scope of thesis................................................................................................... 4 
1.4 Research questions ............................................................................................ 5 
1.5 Success criteria .................................................................................................. 6 
1.6 Research methodology ...................................................................................... 6 
1.7 Research hypotheses ......................................................................................... 8 
1.8 Original contribution ....................................................................................... 10 
1.9 Thesis structure ............................................................................................... 12 
1.10 Design considerations ..................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review .................................................... 18 
2.1 Overview of mobile computing ...................................................................... 19 
2.1.1 Evolution of mobile network generations ................................................... 19 
2.1.2 The challenges of mobile computing .......................................................... 21 
2.1.3 Security issues in mobile computing .......................................................... 23 
2.2 4G mobile networks ........................................................................................ 24 
2.2.1 Overview of 4G mobile networks ............................................................... 24 
2.2.2 Challenges to 4G ......................................................................................... 25 
2.2.3 4G heterogeneous networks ........................................................................ 27 
2.3 The Y-Comm framework ................................................................................ 28 
2.3.1 An overview of Y-Comm ........................................................................... 29 
2.3.2 Y-Comm security framework ..................................................................... 32 
Table of Contents 
IX 
 
2.3.3 Analysis ....................................................................................................... 34 
2.4 Overview of policy .......................................................................................... 36 
2.4.1 Policy definition .......................................................................................... 36 
2.4.2 Motivation of policy-based systems ........................................................... 37 
2.5 Security policy overview ................................................................................. 39 
2.5.1 Security policy types ................................................................................... 39 
2.5.2 Access control models ................................................................................ 41 
2.6 Security management ...................................................................................... 43 
2.7 Policy specification languages ........................................................................ 44 
2.7.1 Ponder ......................................................................................................... 44 
2.7.2 PDL ............................................................................................................. 45 
2.7.3 XACML ...................................................................................................... 45 
2.7.4 LaSCO ......................................................................................................... 46 
2.7.5 Tower .......................................................................................................... 46 
2.7.6 Ponder2 ....................................................................................................... 47 
2.7.7 Choosing a policy system ........................................................................... 48 
2.8 ITU-T recommendation .................................................................................. 49 
2.9 Overview of malicious event detection mechanisms ...................................... 52 
2.9.1 IA detection mechanism .............................................................................. 52 
2.10 Policy-based security management systems ................................................... 54 
2.10.1 Automatic policy-based systems ............................................................. 54 
2.10.2 Security management system based on IP address and policy zones ..... 57 
2.11 Summary ......................................................................................................... 58 
Chapter 3: Preliminaries .......................................................................................... 60 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 61 
3.2 Structure of future heterogeneous networks ................................................... 62 
3.3 Justification of the danger of access to a user’s identity ................................. 63 
3.4 Security requirements of 4G mobile networks................................................ 64 
3.5 Assumptions .................................................................................................... 65 
3.6 Problems facing SMS4HN in the Y-Comm environment ............................... 67 
3.7 Fundamentals of Ponder2 ................................................................................ 69 
3.7.1 Authorisation policies in Ponder2 ............................................................... 71 
3.7.2 Self-managed cell ........................................................................................ 72 
Table of Contents 
X 
 
3.8 Resolution of policy conflict ........................................................................... 76 
3.9 Summary ......................................................................................................... 77 
Chapter 4: Security Management System Framework for 4G Heterogeneous 
Networks 79 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 80 
4.2 Problem definition ........................................................................................... 80 
4.3 Framework overview ...................................................................................... 81 
4.3.1 The management layer ................................................................................ 82 
4.3.2 The framework ............................................................................................ 83 
4.4 Sequence of messages in the SMS4HN .......................................................... 87 
4.5 Summary ......................................................................................................... 89 
Chapter 5: Prototype Implementation of the SMS4HN ........................................ 90 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 91 
5.2 Response of SMS4HN to a malicious event ................................................... 92 
5.3 SMS4HN specifications .................................................................................. 94 
5.3.1 SMS4HN obligation policies ...................................................................... 94 
5.3.2 Authorisation policies in SMS4HN ............................................................ 97 
5.3.3 Communication between managed objects in the SMS4HN .................... 101 
5.3.4 Dealing with SMS4HN exceptions ........................................................... 103 
5.3.5 Sending messages to managed objects in the SMS4HN ........................... 104 
5.4 SMS4HN policy enforcement points ............................................................ 105 
5.5 The policy feedback loop in the SMS4HN ................................................... 107 
5.6 The SMS4HN’s response to events ............................................................... 109 
5.7 Summary ....................................................................................................... 111 
Chapter 6: Case Study ........................................................................................... 113 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 114 
6.2 Case study scenario ....................................................................................... 115 
6.3 Vertical handover in the Y-Comm network .................................................. 116 
6.4 The SMS4HN in the Y-Comm network ........................................................ 119 
6.4.1 Policy enforcement points in the Y-Comm network ................................ 120 
6.4.2 PAF in the Y-Comm network ................................................................... 121 
6.4.3 The self-managed cell in the Y-Comm network environment .................. 122 
6.4.4 SMS4HN obligation policies .................................................................... 123 
Table of Contents 
XI 
 
6.4.5 Authorisation policies in SMS4HN .......................................................... 125 
6.4.6 Case study results ...................................................................................... 126 
6.5 Detection of a malicious event ...................................................................... 128 
6.5.1 Creating a normal model ........................................................................... 128 
6.6 Summary ....................................................................................................... 132 
Chapter 7: Evaluation of the Security Management System for 4G 
Heterogeneous Networks ............................................................................................ 134 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 135 
7.2 Extensibility .................................................................................................. 136 
7.2.1 The ability to respond to additional malicious events ............................... 136 
7.2.2 The ability to enforce policies without additional hardware ..................... 140 
7.2.3 The ability to communicate among managed objects using additional 
communication protocols ...................................................................................... 141 
7.3 Modifiability ................................................................................................. 142 
7.4 Self-management ........................................................................................... 143 
7.5 Interoperability .............................................................................................. 145 
7.6 Scalability ...................................................................................................... 146 
7.7 Limitations of the SMS4HN ......................................................................... 148 
7.8 Summary ....................................................................................................... 148 
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Work ............................................................ 150 
8.1 Summary of the thesis ................................................................................... 151 
8.2 Success criteria .............................................................................................. 152 
8.3 Contributions ................................................................................................. 153 
8.4 Future work ................................................................................................... 154 
Appendix ...................................................................................................................... 168 
A.1 Sending messages to managed objects using a web service ......................... 168 
A.2 Using other communication protocols with the SMS4HN ........................... 169 
A.3 Writing a new policy for the SMS4HN......................................................... 170 
A.4 Writing a vertical privilege escalation policy ............................................... 170 
A.5 Writing a managed object ............................................................................. 172 
A.6 PonderTalk method mapping ........................................................................ 174 
A.7 Ponder2 installation ....................................................................................... 175 
A.8 Running the SMS4HN .................................................................................. 176 
List of Abbreviations  
XII 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1-1. Relations between the hypotheses, Y-Comm, and SMS4HN ........................ 9 
Figure 2-1. Evolution of mobile network generations .................................................... 21 
Figure 2-2. The Y-Comm framework [37] ..................................................................... 29 
Figure 2-3. The full Y-Comm architecture [26].............................................................. 33 
Figure 2-4. Security objectives, mechanisms and policy types ...................................... 41 
Figure 2-5. TMN Management Functions ...................................................................... 51 
Figure 2-6. Wireless policy-based logical architecture [78] ........................................... 56 
Figure 2-7. Wireless security management system [79] ................................................. 58 
Figure 3-1. The core-end point structure with the attached networks [83] ..................... 63 
Figure 3-2. The assumptions of the SMS4HN ................................................................ 67 
Figure 3-3. PAF framework in Ponder2 [88] .................................................................. 71 
Figure 3-4. Self-managed cell architecture [89] ............................................................. 73 
Figure 3-5. Policy-based feedback loop [72] .................................................................. 74 
Figure 3-6. Policy conflict resolution in the Y-Comm network structure (adapted from 
[83]) ......................................................................................................................... 77 
Figure 4-1. Management layer of the Y-Comm network framework (adapted from [36])
 ................................................................................................................................. 83 
Figure 4-2. The proposed SMS4HN functional diagram ................................................ 84 
Figure 4-3. The IA’s internal processes .......................................................................... 85 
Figure 4-4. Sequence diagram of the SMS4HN when there are no security violations.. 88 
Figure 4-5. Sequence diagram of the SMS4HN during a security violation .................. 88 
Figure 5-1. ECA policy in SMS4HN. ............................................................................. 96 
Figure 5-2. Event template of SMS4HN. ........................................................................ 97 
List of Abbreviations  
XIII 
 
Figure 5-3. The authorisation policy commands in SMS4HN. ....................................... 98 
Figure 5-4. Example of an authorisation policy conflict. ............................................... 99 
Figure 5-5. The conflict between two opposite authorisation policies. ........................ 101 
Figure 5-6. Policy enforcement points in SMS4HN (adapted from [83])..................... 106 
Figure 5-7. SMS4HN policy feedback loop .................................................................. 109 
Figure 5-8. Snapshot of SMS4HN after it detects a malicious event............................ 110 
Figure 5-9. Snapshot of the output file of the malicious events record. ....................... 111 
Figure 6-1. Y-Comm network structure (case study).................................................... 117 
Figure 6-2. EUD vertical handover sequence diagram ................................................. 118 
Figure 6-3. Location of the policy enforcement points in the Y-Comm network 
architecture ............................................................................................................ 120 
Figure 6-4. PAF of the Y-Comm network .................................................................... 121 
Figure 6-5. Policy feedback loop for the SMS4HN in the Y-Comm network .............. 123 
Figure 6-6. ECA policy in SMS4HN in the VFO network. .......................................... 124 
Figure 6-7. Event template of SMS4HN in the VFO network. ..................................... 125 
Figure 6-8. Authorisation policy commands in SMS4HN. ........................................... 126 
Figure 6-9. Snapshot of SMS4HN after it detects a malicious event............................ 127 
Figure 6-10. Snapshot of the output file of the malicious events records. .................... 128 
Figure 6-11. Linux user and kernel space [76] ............................................................. 130 
Figure 6-12. Main steps for creating a normal model of application behaviours ......... 132 
Figure 7-1. The commands used to create a template for the vertical privilege escalation 
of an event. ............................................................................................................ 138 
Figure 7-2. The commands used to specify the negative authorisation policy for an 
EUD. ..................................................................................................................... 139 
Figure 7-3. Activation and deactivation policies in SMS4HN. .................................... 143 
Figure A.8-1. Ubuntu response after Ponder2 system installation................................ 176 
Figure A.8-2. Ubuntu response after running the SMS4HN ......................................... 177 
List of Abbreviations  
XIV 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
1G The first generation of mobile networks 
2G The second generation of mobile networks 
3G The third generation of mobile networks 
4G The fourth generation of mobile networks 
AAAC Authentication, Authorisation, Accounting, and Cost 
AEL Applications Environments Layer 
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement 
AMPS Analogue Mobile Phone Systems 
AR Access Router 
CA3C Central Authentication, Authorisation, Accounting, and Cost 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access 
CQoSB Central Quality of Service Broker 
CTS Core Transport System Layer 
DA3C Domain Authentication, Authorisation, Accounting, and Cost 
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
ECA Event Condition Action 
List of Abbreviations  
XV 
 
ETL End Transport Layer 
EUD End User Device 
Gbit/s Giga bit per second 
GSM Global Systems for Mobile communications 
HPL Hardware Platform Layer 
IA Intelligent Agent 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
Kbit/s Kilobit per second 
LaSCO Language for Security Constraint on Objects 
LTE Long Term Evolution  
MAC Media Access control Address 
MAN Metropolitan Area Network 
MEID Mobile Equipment Identifier 
MHz Mega Hertz 
MIWSMS Mobile IP-based Wireless Security Management System  
NAL Network Abstraction Layer 
NAS Network Architecture Security 
NLA Network-Level Agreement 
NML Network Management Layer 
List of Abbreviations  
XVI 
 
NQL Network QoS Layer 
NTS Network Transport Security 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection model 
PAF Ponder2 Authorisation Framework 
PDP Policy Decision Point 
PEP Policy Enforcement Point 
PML Policy Management Layer 
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network 
PWLSMS Policy-based Wireless Local area network Security Management 
System 
QBS QoS-Based Security 
QL Quality of Service Layer 
QoS Quality of Service 
REL Reconfiguration Layer 
RMI Remote Method Invocation 
SAS Service and Application Security 
SCI System Call Interface 
SLA Service-Level Agreements 
SMC Self-Managed Cell 
SMS4HN Security Management System for 4G Heterogeneous Networks 
List of Abbreviations  
XVII 
 
SPL Service Platform Layer 
STRBAC Spatio-temporal Role-based Access Control model 
TACS Total Access Communication Systems 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol 
TMN Telecommunications Management Network 
ToS Theft of Service 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
VFO Virgin Fibre Optic 
VHL Vertical Handover Layer 
WiMax Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
XACML Extensible Access Control Mark-up Language 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
 Introduction 
 
 
Objectives 
- Introduce the research and explain its motivation; 
- Present the research questions; 
- Present the research methodology; 
- Present the thesis structure. 
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 Introduction  
Security management systems offer promising solutions for protecting heterogeneous 
networks. Part of their function is to reduce the human input required to manage a 
network, but they are driven by security needs and must respond instantly to malicious 
activities that threaten the network.  
The Y-Comm framework, a significant architecture for 4G mobile networks, tends to 
meet users’ service requirements for high speed and availability anywhere at any time. 
The heterogeneousness and openness of Y-Comm networks has created concerns about 
their security, which must be assured and verified. These concerns have been 
investigated, and it has been concluded that Y-Comm network security should be 
improved. This research study proposes a security management system that achieves the 
security requirements of 4G mobile networks. The proposed Security Management 
System for 4G Heterogeneous Networks (SMS4HN) is designed as a policy-based 
system.  
This PhD research thesis offers a detailed account of the development and evaluation of 
the SMS4HN. Section 1.2 of this introductory chapter presents the motivation for the 
study, then Section 1.3 explains the scope of the thesis and Section 1.4 presents the 
research questions. The success criteria for the study are explained in Section 1.5, then 
Section 1.6 sets out the research methodology and Section 1.7 states the research 
hypotheses. Section 1.8 identifies the original contributions made by this PhD research, 
Section 1.9 explains the thesis structure and the chapter ends with an account of the 
design considerations.  
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 Motivation 
Many research studies have investigated ways to improve communication services for 
mobile network users. One of the most challenging problems in mobile computing, and 
in 4G heterogeneous networks in particular, is security [1, 2]. Several research studies 
have proposed Y-Comm for 4G heterogeneous networks. An important goal of Y-
Comm networks is to provide reliable and seamless service everywhere at all times. Y-
Comm is an open network, which means that the infrastructure is owned by different 
network providers. The open nature of Y-Comm leads to security risks and 
vulnerabilities, because if a single provider is compromised then the entire network will 
be affected [3].  
Park and Park investigated the security of 4G heterogeneous networks and found that 
they suffer from several security threats, because such networks are IP-based and open 
[3]. The X.805 systematic tool was used in that study to investigate the security of 4G 
networks. In another study, Mahdi et al. [4] found that 4G heterogeneous networks 
suffer from more security threats than the previous (3G) generation of mobile networks, 
because each 3G network is owned by a single provider.  
The security concerns associated with 4G heterogeneous networks motivated the present 
researcher to propose a solution that provides a secure environment. This research study 
proposes a policy-based security management system because these systems are known 
for their dynamic and efficient solutions. However, the nature of the Y-Comm network 
makes the implementation of a security management system difficult. This research 
Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
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investigates several approaches and concludes that the Y-Comm network needs a novel 
security management system.  
The security requirements of 4G heterogeneous networks have been identified by 
several research studies [5-7]. In the Y-Comm security model, one requirement which 
has not been clearly met is protecting end user devices (EUDs) from being used as 
attack tools. This also motivated this research study to develop the proposed security 
management system and meet the requirements of the 4G heterogeneous network.  
 Scope of thesis 
Security management systems focus on four main tasks: detection, prevention, 
containment and recovery, and security administration. This research presents a 
mechanism that detects malicious events in EUDs, but the detection implementation is 
outside the scope of this thesis, which presents the proposed framework’s prototype 
implementation for the security engine. This is the most important part of the system. 
This research also describes the main interaction with the Y-Comm network 
components. The implementation of the security engine demonstrates that the security 
management system is able to enforce policies in this heterogeneous environment. This 
research assumes the Y-Comm network components are able to provide an interface to 
interact with the managed objects and receive PonderTalk messages. The primary 
purpose of the system is to control the behaviour of the policy-based system to interact 
with the Y-Comm network components. This research shows that the security 
management system is able to respond to malicious events through its demonstrated 
Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
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ability to respond to the theft of a user’s identity, which may lead to further attacks on 
the Y-Comm network. 
 Research questions 
The primary research question is: 
Can Y-Comm security be improved by adopting a security management model? 
To answer this question, this research investigated the security requirements of 4G 
mobile networks. One requirement was not clearly met, so it led to the following 
question: 
How can an end user device in the Y-Comm network environment be prevented 
from being used as an attack tool? 
To answer this question, this research requires that the proposed SMS4HN follow ITU-
T Recommendation M.3400 when responding to malicious events. 
The third question is: 
Why does this research consider access to user’s information more harmful in Y-
Comm networks? 
To answer this, the research explains the danger of accessing the user’s identity and 
how it leads to attacks on the peripheral network and then the whole network.  
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 Success criteria 
The success of the proposed system is based on its ability to work in the Y-Comm 
network environment. The framework and prototype implementation seek to 
demonstrate that this environment is more secure when our proposed system is 
implemented. This research considers that the security management system should meet 
certain defined criteria to work efficiently in the Y-Comm heterogeneous network 
environment. These criteria include: 
- The extensibility of the proposed system to respond to additional malicious 
events and to enforce policies without additional hardware; 
- The ability to modify the behaviour of the proposed system without needing to 
suspend the system’s services; 
- The ability of the proposed policy-based system to be self-managed; 
- Interoperability with the Y-Comm network components to enforce the policies. 
 Research methodology 
The methodology used in this study was constructive research, because this suits 
research in computer science. Constructive research requires the new research to be 
developed via a framework, theory, model, or algorithm [8]. This research project 
developed the contribution in six stages: the first addressed the research background, the 
next four were scientific research work stages, and the final stage was the writing of this 
thesis. The details of these stages are as follows:  
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Stage 1: Research background 
The background stage began with an overview of the research environment and the 
main concepts related to this research. This study used several resources, including the 
Google Scholar search engine, the ACM digital library, the British Library, and IEEE 
Xplore.  
Stage 2: Framework 
This stage focused on designing the SMS4HN framework to achieve the research 
objectives. It involved defining the components of the framework in detail, and 
explaining how these components interact with the Y-Comm network components.  
Stage 3: Prototype implementation of the SMS4HN 
This stage of the research explored the actions of the proposed system during a 
malicious event. It involved explaining the specific details of implementation and 
demonstrating the proposed system’s ability to work in the Y-Comm network 
environment.  
Stage 4: Case study  
This next stage was to study how the SMS4HN would work in a real example of the Y-
Comm network and to explain how the EUD would move from one peripheral network 
to another. Finally, this stage considered the intelligent agent (IA) detection mechanism, 
which is a component of the framework.  
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Stage 5: Evaluation of the proposed system  
At the fifth stage, the proposed system was evaluated and compared to related research 
based on a set of criteria. This stage served to demonstrate the practical applicability of 
the proposed system to the Y-Comm network environment.  
Stage 6: Write up 
The final stage was to write up the work done in the earlier stages, in the form of a 
doctoral thesis. 
 Research hypotheses 
Hypotheses are significant in the research process because they can be used as a guide 
for the preparation and development of the research. They also help to determine what 
data it is necessary to collect and analyse. “A hypothesis is a logical supposition, a 
reasonable guess, an educated conjecture. It provides a tentative explanation of a 
phenomenon under investigation” [9].  
This section lists the hypotheses tested in this research, then Figure 1-1 illustrates their 
relations with the Y-Comm architecture and the proposed SMS4HN. The hypotheses 
are as follows: 
H1- Stealing a user’s identity leads to an attack on a peripheral network and then on the 
whole Y-Comm network. 
H2- The different architecture of Y-Comm leads to more security concerns. 
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H3- This research follows ITU-T recommendations by providing better security 
management systems. 
H4- The CA3C server in Y-Comm is able to interact with the proposed SMS4HN in 
order to enforce negative authorisation policies. 
H5- The access router in Y-Comm is able to interact with the proposed SMS4HN in 
order to enforce negative authorisation policies. 
H6- The IA is scalable and will work with various EUDs. 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Relations between the hypotheses, Y-Comm, and SMS4HN 
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 Original contribution 
The main contribution of this research study is to propose a security management 
system suitable for the nature of the Y-Comm network. ‘Suitable’ here means that the 
system is able to enforce security policies in this complex architecture. The SMS4HN as 
presented is a novel security management system for Y-Comm. The different 
architecture of the Y-Comm network requires a novel security management system. 
This research study reviews the security issues affecting Y-Comm networks and the 
existing security management systems for similar wired and wireless networks, and 
addresses the gap in meeting the security requirements of 4G mobile networks. A 
policy-based system was chosen to achieve the research goals: to send messages to and 
control the behaviour of the components of Y-Comm networks.  
The original contributions of this research study are as follows: 
- A new approach to protecting Y-Comm networks. 
The approach presented prevents an EUD from being used as an attack tool in 
the Y-Comm environment. It follows ITU-T recommendation M.3400 to deal 
with the security violations in the network. 
- A policy-based framework to enforce policies in Y-Comm networks.  
This framework is built on the top layer of the Y-Comm network model. Its 
purpose is to respond to malicious events that may harm the whole Y-Comm 
network. This research considers using extensible, modifiable, self-managed and 
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scalable components that will be able to interoperate with the heterogeneous 
components of the Y-Comm network.  
- A self-managed cell to interact with the managed objects.  
This self-managed cell shows the interactions between the components of the 
SMS4HN and the Y-Comm network. The cell is triggered by the EUD and 
moves to the security engine, then ends by enforcing policies on the managed 
objects, such as the access router and the core endpoint server. Thus, it 
represents a policy feedback loop. 
- An IA detection mechanism that detects malicious behaviour in an EUD.  
This IA mechanism explains how to detect malicious behaviour in an EUD that 
may result in compromised privileges or the theft of sensitive data. The 
mechanism as presented is limited to design descriptions and theories. This 
research specifies the appropriate mechanism for a specific smartphone 
operating system (Android OS). 
The novelty of this mechanism is that the IA in the EUD interacts with the 
security engine in the CAS3C, thus providing better security for the Y-Comm 
environment. Stealing users’ identities is more harmful in this environment, 
because of the increase in user privileges on the network. Thus, the IA detects 
this kind of malicious event and reports it to the security engine.  
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 Thesis structure 
This section outlines the contents of each of the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of mobile computing, discussing the associated 
challenges and security issues. It then presents an overview of a 4G mobile network, 
specifically a Y-Comm network. Next, it gives details of the Y-Comm network 
architecture and security model, explaining the security concerns affecting Y-Comm 
networks and how important it is to address these. The fundamental concepts of policy 
are then explained, along with the motivation for the construction and use of a policy-
based system in this research. There is then an account of the security policies adopted, 
more specifically the authorisation and obligation policies, followed by a summary of 
access control models. The chapter defines security management, discusses policy 
specification languages and justifies the use of Ponder2. Different approaches to 
security management systems are then discussed, with particular consideration of those 
which have been proposed to work on wireless and wired networks. Finally, the chapter 
explains why this research follows the ITU-T recommendations on responding to 
malicious events in the Y-Comm network. 
Chapter 3: Preliminaries 
Chapter 3 begins by discussing the structure of future heterogeneous networks, 
including Y-Comm networks. It then provides a justification for considering the access 
and theft of an end user’s identity to be dangerous in this environment. Next, it 
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discusses the security requirements of 4G mobile networks and how some requirements 
have not been clearly met in the Y-Comm framework. It lists the assumptions made in 
this research study, then outlines the fundamentals and principles of Ponder2, such as 
the policy authorisation framework and the self-managed cell. Finally, it considers the 
conflict resolution of policies that is expected to occur in the Y-Comm network 
environment.  
Chapter 4: Framework of the security management system for 4G heterogeneous 
networks 
Chapter 4 first defines the problem that this research aims to solve, then discusses the 
design considerations affecting the proposed system. It next presents an overview of the 
framework with details of each part, including the management layer, IA, security 
engine, security database, and security administrator. Finally, it explains the sequence of 
messages that provide a sequence diagram for each case in the system.   
Chapter 5: Prototype implementation of the security management system for 4G 
heterogeneous networks 
The fifth chapter introduces a scenario for the proposed system’s interaction during a 
malicious event. It then describes the problems that the proposed system faces in the Y-
Comm network environment. This chapter also explains the policy enforcement points 
in the proposed SMS4HN. These include two components of the Y-Comm network: the 
access router and the core-endpoint server. In addition, the chapter describes the policy 
feedback loop that illustrates the interaction of the SMS4HN components with the Y-
Comm network components. It presents the SMS4HN specifications with details of the 
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obligation and authorisation policies, and shows how the SMS4HN deals with the 
authorisation policy conflicts that may occur in the Y-Comm network environment. The 
chapter also explains how the managed objects communicate, and how to deal with 
exceptions and errors that may occur in the SMS4HN. Next, it describes a way to send 
messages to the managed objects, so that they can be controlled. Finally, it shows 
snapshots of the SMS4HN’s responses to events.  
Chapter 6: Case Study 
Chapter six reports a case study of the practical application of the proposed SMS4HN. It 
first describes the scenario, then explains the vertical handover of an EUD in the Y-
Comm network. Its explanation of how the proposed SMS4HN works in the case study 
includes details of the policy authorisation framework, policy enforcement points, and 
the self-managed cell. It next describes the IA’s mechanism for detection of malicious 
events, using an anomaly-based detection system. Finally, this chapter explains how to 
create a normal model of the application’s behaviour and how it monitors system calls.  
Chapter 7: Evaluation of the security management system for 4G heterogeneous 
networks 
Chapter seven describes the evaluation of the SMS4HN based on five criteria chosen to 
measure its ability to work in the heterogeneous environment of a Y-Comm network. 
For each criterion, the SMS4HN is compared with other security management systems. 
The first criterion is the system’s extensibility, which is measured in three ways: by its 
ability to respond to additional malicious events, its ability to enforce policies without 
additional hardware, and its use of additional communication protocols. The next three 
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criteria are the modifiability of the SMS4HN, its self-management, and its 
interoperability, in other words its ability to work with the Y-Comm network’s 
heterogeneous components. The chapter then evaluates the scalability of the proposed 
SMS4HN and ends by considering some limitations of the system. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion and future work 
The final chapter summarises the research and makes suggestions for future work.  
  Design considerations 
This final section of the introductory chapter discusses the design considerations arising 
from the need for this research project to address the particular nature of the Y-Comm 
network architecture. Chapter 2 explains that a Y-Comm network is a convergence of 
both wired and wireless networks. This convergence increases the challenges in creating 
a system for this environment.  
The design of the proposed security management system involves communication and 
interoperability with components in the Y-Comm network architecture and EUDs. 
Components such as access routers and core-end point servers are diverse and may 
contain different operating systems, but Ponder2, which is the tool used in the proposed 
system, has been used in previous heterogeneous distributed systems and has worked in 
such environments [10, 11].  
The following is a list of the five major design considerations, corresponding to the 
evaluation criteria mentioned in the above summary of Chapter 7. 
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- Extensibility:   
An important characteristic of the proposed system is extensibility. Because the 
Y-Comm network contains a large number of components, the policy-
management system should be extendable to include new functionalities. The 
proposed system uses a self-managed cell (SMC) network design to meet the 
extensibility requirement. An SMC, as explained in Chapter 3, increases the 
system’s ability to interact with new resources in the heterogeneous 
environment.  
- Modifiability: 
A second important consideration is the ability to modify the behaviour of the 
policy-based system while it is running, without needing to stop the system for 
recompile or restart, because the Y-Comm is expected to have connection 
services that should be available all the time. 
- The self-management of the policy-based system: 
Self-management is also important for the SMS4HN, to reduce the need for 
human input, which would be too slow to match the rapid changes in the Y-
Comm network. The self-management of policy-based system means responding 
to malicious events instantly without the need for human involvement. This 
leads to more efficiency and better security for the proposed SMS4HN. 
- Interoperability: 
Interoperability with the heterogeneous components of the Y-Comm network is 
another important design consideration, because Y-Comm has many different 
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components and technologies with all of which the SMS4HN needs to be able to 
interact. 
- Scalability: 
The scalability of the SMS4HN is an important consideration, because the Y-
Comm is a large network and is expected to increase in size. 
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Objectives: 
- Provide an overview of mobile computing and 4G; 
- Provide an overview of Y-Comm; 
- Provide an overview of policy; 
- Discuss policy specification languages; 
- Discuss similar policy-based security management systems. 
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 Overview of mobile computing 
2.1.1 Evolution of mobile network generations 
Mobile networks have developed rapidly. There is always further demand for other uses 
of mobile devices. These demands encourage innovations and research to provide 
further designs for mobile networks. Since the 1980s, when its development began with 
the 0G precellular mobile technology, wireless technology has gone many through 
significant changes. Then, in the early 1990s, 1G technology was released and mobile 
devices became known as cell phones [12].  
At this time, the first generation of mobile communication networks used analogue 
signalling. Analogue systems were implemented in North America and were called 
analogue mobile phone systems (AMPS). Total access communication systems (TACS), 
another 1G technology, were implemented in the rest of the world. The analogue system 
is a circuit-switch technology which was used only for voice calls [13].  
After 1G, the second generation of mobile networks emerged and underwent very 
strong growth in the number of end users, due to the better service provided. These 2G 
networks enjoyed the advantages of other technologies, such as compression and coding 
techniques, combined with digital technology. At one time, there were three main 
mobile systems: time division multiple access (TDMA), code division multiple access 
(CDMA) and global systems for mobile communications (GSM) [14]. 
TDMA was implemented in North America in 1993. It operated in the AMPS frequency 
of 824 MHz. There were also the 894 MHz CDMA systems, which used the direct 
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sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and worked in the 1850–1990 MHz frequency range 
to support CDMA users. GSM was designed for voice services and for limited data 
capabilities, such as the short message service [12]. By the late 1990s, 3G cellular 
systems had been released to satisfy the need for a universal technology and advanced 
performance. In addition, 3G communication networks provided higher speeds for 
information transfer of at least 200 Kbit/s. These standards met those of 
the International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 [15]. Recent 3G versions, often 
called 3.5G and 3.75G, also support higher speeds up to several Mbit/s for smartphones. 
Subsequent versions of 3G provided further applications in wireless video calls and 
mobile TV. Different standards of 3G have been applied in different regions of the 
world. The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) system was 
introduced in 2001 and primarily implemented in Europe, Japan and China. The cell 
phones were hybrid and were able to work on both GSM and UMTS systems. An 
advanced release of UMTS, HSPA+, supported speeds up to 56 Mbit/s. Another 
standard of 3G, called CDMA2000, was implemented in North America and South 
Korea [13]. Smartphone applications increased the demand for further developments in 
high-speed connections and more reliable service, which were then supported by the 
design of fourth generation (4G) technology for mobile networks. In section 2 of this 
chapter, 4G will be explained in detail. Figure 2.1 summarises the evolution of mobile 
generation networks. 
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2.1.2 The challenges of mobile computing 
There are challenges in designing software systems for mobile computing which are 
quite different from those faced in designing for stationary networked devices such as 
PCs. Wired communications face fewer challenges than wireless communications do. 
The particular challenges facing mobile computing are as follows: 
- Wireless communications are affected by the environment, which interacts with 
signals. The surrounding environment can block the signal, make noise and 
 
Figure 2-1. Evolution of mobile network generations 
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echoes, etc. Hence, wireless communication involves lower bandwidths, higher 
error rates and the possibility of disconnection. These factors cause 
communication latency as a result of retransmission, error-control protocol 
processing, etc. [16]. Therefore, network failure is often a greater issue in mobile 
computing than it is in stationary networked devices.  
- Loss of some information happens in wireless networks such as 3G mobile 
networks more frequently than it does over wired networks, due to the ability of 
users to move physically to different places while connected to the network. 
Thus, there is need for improved technology to provide better service to end-user 
devices. 
- Mobile devices are resource-poor compared to static computing devices. 
Considerations specific to mobile computing, such as weight, power and size, 
affect computational resources such as processor speed, battery, memory size 
and disk capacity. Even if the capabilities of mobile devices continue to improve 
as they have done, they will always be resource-poor compared to static 
computing devices. Moreover, concern about power consumption needs to be 
taken into consideration at the levels of hardware and software design [17]. 
- Mobility is susceptible to risks. There is the possibility of devices being lost, 
stolen and damaged as a result of weather problems, unlike stationary devices, 
which are typically kept in safe places.  
These challenges and constraints must be taken into consideration while designing 
hardware or software for mobile computing. Some of them have been considered during 
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the design of the proposed approach to enforcing policies and collecting data through 
intelligent agents on mobile devices. 
2.1.3 Security issues in mobile computing 
In recent years, there have been major developments in mobile technology. One of the 
greatest concerns in such developments is security. The absence of wires provides 
mobility, while network access allows the use of communication-based applications. 
This combination of mobility and networking presents new and bigger challenges. One 
of the more challenging problems is security [1, 2]. The security solutions for fixed-
computing devices are simple and straightforward compared with those for mobile 
computing. One such solution is the physical isolation of each fixed computer and 
database from other environments. By contrast, it is difficult to isolate mobile 
computing devices because of limited resources and the necessity of communication 
with mobile support stations [18, 19]. Hence, mobile computing is affected by two 
particular security issues, concerning location information and denial of service (DoS). 
 Location information issues 
The location of a mobile device will often constitute important data, whereas most users 
want their location to be kept confidential and want to remain anonymous from other 
networks and users [20]. There are many problems related to anonymity, including the 
trust afforded by the mobile support stations and the problem of sharing and transferring 
location data between network nodes. This requirement is more important when the user 
moves between different nodes (different zones) which have different levels of trust [18, 
20]. 
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 Denial of service 
A DoS attack can occur in mobile networks if an overwhelming number of registration 
requests are sent to the visiting network. The receiver cannot detect that the requests are 
fake until it attempts to authenticate each request. To authenticate each request keeps 
the network busy and the fake requests cause the real registration request to become lost 
[1].  
 4G mobile networks 
2.2.1 Overview of 4G mobile networks 
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) defines the International Mobile 
Telecommunications-Advanced (IMT-Advanced) standard as the global standard for 4G 
wireless communications. As specified by the ITU’s ITU-R Recommendation, 4G 
provides very high speed connections, such as 100 Mbit/s for outdoor environments and 
1 Gbit/s for indoor environments. In addition, it is recommended that a 4G network 
should have high capacity, low cost, low latency, good quality of service and good 
coverage [15]. 4G networks have been developed in response to the increasing need for 
ubiquitous connectivity and service provision [4, 21]. There are many candidates, such 
as Long Term Evolution (LTE) Advanced and WirelessMAN-Advanced, which seek to 
meet these requirements [22], especially the need for high speed, while other candidates 
are trying to build a 4G heterogeneous network as a convergence of wired and wireless 
networks. Among the new architectures designed for this heterogeneous network, Y-
Comm comprises a faster core network and a slower peripheral network. 
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There are many differences between 4G and previous versions of mobile 
communication systems. One important difference is that 4G mobile networks will 
operate completely on the TCP/IP architecture. This design decision was made to 
reduce cost and to break what has been known as the closed cellular market, supported 
by limited service providers [6]. This study proposes a system based on Y-Comm, 
which will be explained in the following sections. 
2.2.2 Challenges to 4G 
An important goal of 4G mobile networks is to provide reliable and seamless service 
everywhere at all times. However, due to the high requirements of such networks, there 
are many challenges facing those seeking to meet these technical requirements, 
including cost, quality of service, billing and security. 
 Cost of 4G technology 
Although 4G mobile networks use a higher frequency band to achieve higher speed data 
transmission, reducing the costs of using 4G is an important demand which has 
increased the challenges to 4G [23]. 
The problem is that using higher frequencies reduces the radius of coverage of each 
base station [5]. To overcome this, providers need to increase coverage while providing 
higher frequencies. Among the technologies used to address this are improving the 
modulation and demodulation techniques, and using adaptive array antennae and low-
noise receivers [5, 23, 24]. However, these attempts to overcome this challenge have not 
fully satisfied the requirements of IMT-Advanced in 4G networks, as explained above 
in section 2.1. 
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 Quality of service  
Another challenge to 4G mobile networks is quality of service (QoS), which raises 
many concerns. First, many different services generate traffic, which leads to heavier 
traffic loads on the network. Moreover, transmitting the various streams associated with 
these diverse services, such as video, voice and data, imposes a range of different QoS 
requirements [12]. A second source of QoS issues occurs during handover, due to the 
converging of non-IP-based and IP-based networks and devices in 4G mobile networks 
[25]. Numerous studies, including [26, 27], have attempted to find solutions to this 
challenge; however, their proposed architecture needs more experimental and analytical 
research to ensure that the performance satisfies the 4G requirements. Moreover, end-
user devices have to process signals received from various systems, discover available 
services and connect to the appropriate service providers. QoS is affected, because 
different service providers have their own various protocols, which may be 
incompatible with each other and with the diverse EUDs, making it difficult to provide 
satisfactory service to the end user [12]; however, this challenge will not be addressed 
in the present study, because many other research studies have investigated it. 
 Servicing and billing 
Another challenge to 4G is servicing and billing, which are becoming increasingly 
complex, particularly due to the continual interaction of service providers in allowing 
EUDs to access their networks. Several studies have investigated this challenge and 
proposed frameworks to deal with billing and end-user account information [28-30]. 
 Security and privacy challenges 
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Park and Park [3] showed that 4G networks suffer from many security threats, leading 
to service interruptions and disclosure of information, because 4G is IP-based and the 
networks are open and heterogeneous. They used X.805 to analyse the security of 
heterogeneous networks. The X.805 standard was developed by the ITU as a systematic 
tool on the Bell Labs Security Model [31]. Such high numbers of security threats are not 
seen in closed environments (e.g. PSTN), which are better protected against security 
threats. Park and Park obtained their findings by analysing the security threats to 
international communication networks such as IEEE, WiMax, 3GPP and ITU, which 
are integrated and converged to compose the 4G heterogeneous architecture. Mahdi et 
al. [4] also report that 4G heterogeneous networks suffer from more security threats than 
do closed networks. They examine the possibility of using 3G security techniques such 
as AKA for 4G networks. These threats are not seen in 3G networks, because the whole 
network is owned by a single operator. Consequently, there is a need for more research 
into the security of 4G networks. In response, the present study proposes a solution to 
such security concerns in a potential architecture for a 4G heterogeneous network (Y-
Comm).  
2.2.3 4G heterogeneous networks 
End users demand high-speed network connectivity that supports multimedia services, 
such as video calling and voice over IP (VoIP). This demand is more important when 
dealing with wireless networks than wired networks, because users require wireless 
connection services everywhere. The bandwidth in wireless networks remains limited, 
creating a need for the development of efficient ways to satisfy these demands among 
rapidly increasing numbers of users. One proposed solution is the 4G heterogeneous 
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network. Heterogeneous networks are a convergence of all different and wireless 
networks in a common core IP-backbone which supports the interoperability of 
components of the network to provide a ubiquitous networking environment [27, 32]; 
this requires the availability of the service to be increased to meet the 4G requirement of 
high-speed connection anywhere at any time. 
This environment will enable mobile devices to move through networks with fewer 
disruptions such as lost or slow connections. It provides the best available network 
based on the location of the mobile device. Each network in the heterogeneous network 
is deployed by a different service provider [33]. This study investigates an improved Y-
Comm architecture for 4G heterogeneous networks; the next section offers an overview 
of Y-Comm. 
 The Y-Comm framework  
Y-Comm framework was introduced by a group of researchers from the Networking 
Research Group at Middlesex University, the Computer Laboratory at Cambridge 
University, Samsung Research and Deutsche Telekom. The objective of this framework 
is to address new challenges in heterogeneous networks. These challenges are found at 
all levels: network, device and application. The framework maintains a layered 
approach and performs as a reference model, like the Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) reference model [34]. This research proposes a security management system for 
the Y-Comm framework; therefore, it is important to explain the framework thoroughly.  
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2.3.1 An overview of Y-Comm 
Y-Comm is an architecture for mobile heterogeneous networks composed of two 
frameworks: the peripheral and core frameworks. The core network contains wired 
technologies, such as optical networks, while peripheral networks consist of wireless 
technologies such as 3G [35, 36]. This convergence between wired and wireless 
networks represents a forthcoming telecommunication environment aiming to support 
heterogeneous devices, different network technologies and service providers.  
The Y-Comm framework is illustrated in Figure 2.2, which shows shared base systems 
(in blue) containing the network abstraction layer and the hardware platforms. The 
function of both core and peripheral frameworks is to provide services to the 
heterogeneous environment.  
 
Figure 2-2. The Y-Comm framework [37] 
Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
30 
 
2.3.1.1 The peripheral framework 
The peripheral framework deals with mobile devices and other devices connected to 
wireless networks. It is composed of seven layers [37]:  
- The Hardware Platform Layer (HPL) is responsible for the classification of all 
of the various wireless technologies required for the network, including the 
electromagnetic spectrum, MAC and modulation techniques, which compose the 
HPL.  
- The Network Abstraction Layer (NAL) has an interface able to maintain and 
control the various wireless technologies. HPL and NAL have similar 
functionalities for the core and peripheral frameworks. In the core framework, 
they are used to regulate the functions of different wired networks, whereas in 
the peripheral framework, these two layers work on a mobile terminal to support 
the diverse wireless network technologies.  
- The Vertical Handover Layer (VHL) performs vertical handover, which occurs 
when an EUD switches its connection to a different network technology or a 
different level of the current network’s hierarchy [38]. Vertical handover is 
achieved by a client-based handover approach. Therefore, it is controlled by the 
mobile device. After handover, VHL executes the initial handover signalling, 
context transfer and packet reception. 
- The Policy Management Layer (PML) determines whether, when and why 
handover should happen, taking account of many factors such as signal strength. 
It follows policy rules to determine the appropriate time and area for executing 
the handover.  
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- The End Transport Layer (ETL) allows the mobile device to make end-to-end 
connections through the network. It supports the functionalities of the TCP/IP 
module for both its network and transport layers.  
- The Quality of Service Layer (QL) provides two techniques for handling QoS: 
downward and upward QoS. Downward QoS is used when an application 
defines the QoS that it needs and the system responds by managing this QoS 
over different network channels, whereas in upward QoS, the application is 
responsible for adapting to changes in QoS. Moreover, QL monitors the entire 
wireless network, to guarantee reliable connection.  
- The Applications Environments Layer (AEL) defines a group of objects, 
functions and procedures to develop applications that can utilise the framework 
[39].  
2.3.1.2 The core framework 
This subsection is concerned with the functions performed by the core framework, 
which as noted above shares its first two layers with the peripheral framework. The 
remaining layers are the following:  
- The reconfiguration layer (REL), which maintains the main infrastructure parts, 
such as routers, switches and access points, using network management 
applications. 
- The network management layer (NML) is responsible for managing and 
controlling network operations in the core framework. It also collects 
information about locations of wireless networks and sends this to the PML. 
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- The core transport system layer (CTS) moves data across the core network. 
- The network QoS layer (NQL) deals with QoS issues in the core network and 
QoS issues that occur between the peripheral and core networks. 
- The service platform layer (SPL) permits the services to be set up on different 
networks at the same time [39]. 
2.3.2 Y-Comm security framework 
The Y-Comm research group deploys a multilayer security model which works on both 
the core and peripheral frameworks. Figure 2.3 shows the complete Y-Comm 
framework with its security model, which is composed of layers that work 
simultaneously to ensure complete integration with the core and peripheral frameworks. 
Because of the open architecture of Y-Comm networks, the security model is 
responsible for protecting the network entities and not just the data. The security model 
monitors and maintains these entities to ensure they are not harmed or used by 
malicious users. 
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Figure 2-3. The full Y-Comm architecture [26] 
At the top is the service and application security (SAS) layer, which is concerned with 
the authentication, authorisation, accounting and cost (AAAC) functions. It is used in 
the peripheral framework to authenticate users and applications, while in the core 
framework, SAS is responsible for the AAAC functions of the service platform.  
Underneath the SAS is the QoS-based security (QBS) layer, which deals with QoS 
issues and the different QoS needs of the mobile environment when users move across 
the network. QBS also meets the service-level agreement by ensuring that peripheral 
networks are not overloaded due to replications of services from servers. Additionally, 
the QBS layer protects the network from QoS-related attacks such as denial-of-service 
attacks. The next security layer is network transport security (NTS). In the peripheral 
framework, NTS maintains access to and from mobile devices and the availability of 
these devices and services on the Internet, whereas in the core framework it is 
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responsible for maintaining secure connections throughout the network. The final layer 
is network architecture security (NAS), whose functions differ in the two frameworks. 
In the peripheral framework, NAS addresses the security threats arising from using a 
new network technology and ensures that each mobile device is authorised to use a 
network in the framework. In the core framework, NAS works to provide secure access 
to the infrastructure and helps the network management system to decide which 
switches and routers can be used [26, 39]. 
2.3.3 Analysis 
The open nature of 4G means that the infrastructure is accessed from many 
external connection points through peer operators, through the Internet, and via third-
party technologies. All of these elements are at risk of providing holes in security 
and vulnerabilities. In addition, multiple service providers share the core network 
infrastructure, which means that one single provider being compromised affects the 
whole network infrastructure [3]. The Y-Comm research group provides a security 
model, as explained in the previous section. However, when Aiash et al. addressed the 
security challenges to 4G systems by looking at the possibility of applying current 
security techniques to 4G networks, their results indicated that both current and new 
security threats were inherent to 4G technology [4]. Their study used standard X.805 to 
investigate the possibility of applying the 3G Authentication and Key 
Agreement (AKA) to a 4G communication framework. By applying X.805, they 
analysed the AKA protocol in 4G networks and identified many threats to the security 
of 4G networks [4].  
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An earlier study by Park and Park [3] showed that because 4G is an IP-based 
heterogeneous network, there were a number of security threats which could cause 
service interruption and permit data to be hijacked. They also addressed several 
outstanding open issues which required solutions. In a traditional network security 
procedure, the network is secured by preventing threats from accessing network entities. 
However, this is inefficient with an open architecture network such as 4G, because the 
attackers will try to find security vulnerabilities in the operating system and in the 
network protocols or applications, allowing them to create malware which abuses the 
network. According to the new architecture, possible threats within a 4G network 
system are: IP address spoofing, user ID theft, theft of service (ToS), denial of service 
and intrusion attacks [3]. Because of the open architecture and IP-based 
environment, 4G heterogeneous networks are vulnerable to new security threats and 
inherit threats from the Internet which were unseen in 3G because the network 
infrastructure was owned by the service providers and access was denied to other 
network equipment. Moreover, the diversity in EUDs and security levels leads to 
greater security threats [6]. The experience of Internet protection suggests that it should 
involve not only data but also entities, which leads to the belief that in 4G, both the 
entities and infrastructure should be protected [3]. Another security problem occurs in 
mobile communications when the EUD is disconnected from the network for reasons 
such as battery exhaustion. The transition from the level of disconnection to connection 
presents an opportunity for the attacker to show himself as a mobile device or a mobile 
support station [18]. There is an increasing need to protect EUDs, due to the increasing 
danger of rootkits.  Hoglund and Butler [40] define a rootkit as “a kit consisting of small 
and useful programs that allow an attacker to maintain access to ‘root,’ the most 
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powerful user on a computer. In other words, a rootkit is a set of programs and code that 
allows a permanent or consistent, undetectable presence on a computer”. This type of 
malware can modify operating system code and data for malicious reasons. McAfee 
stated in 2010 that rootkits had increased by 600% in the last few years [41] and that 
most malware targeted Android operating systems [42]. In addition, new end-user 
devices are sources of DoS attacks, viruses, worms and so on. Smartphones have 
become attractive targets for attackers and this makes the social implications of the 
attacks more harmful. Some security solutions, such as Y-Comm and Hockey, have 
been proposed for 4G heterogeneous mobile networks. However, they do not take into 
account the security of EUDs, which cause many security vulnerabilities, and they do 
not achieve the security requirements of 4G systems. In response to these shortcomings, 
this research study proposes a security management system for the Y-Comm network. 
The following chapters discuss the proposed system in detail. 
 Overview of policy 
This research provides a policy-based system to cover gaps in security models for 
heterogeneous networks. Therefore, it is important to explain the concept of policy and 
how it can be beneficial for protecting heterogeneous networks. This section provides a 
definition and categorisation of policies, then attempts to explain how a policy-based 
system could be the best solution as a security management system. 
2.4.1 Policy definition 
There are many definitions of policy, due to the increase in complexity of management, 
and this can be seen especially in network management, which is becoming more 
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complex due to the various heterogeneous systems and technologies [43]. The definition 
of policy given in [44] is as “rules to control the behaviour of the system”, and this 
definition can be applied to many systems, especially a heterogeneous network, which 
needs rules to govern the behaviour of its network entities and interactions with EUDs. 
However, [45] defines policy as a set of rules, and finds that each policy contains a 
condition statement and an action statement. This definition relies too precisely on one 
type of policy: event-condition-action (ECA). Although Strassner’s definition suits 
some requirement of policy-based security management systems, such as business 
policy systems, it does not include other security policies, such as authorisation policies. 
There is an important distinction between authorisation policies and obligation policies. 
Obligation policies have two main parts: condition and action. The condition is 
triggered by an event, and when the condition applies, the action should be performed. 
Obligation policies are used to adapt the behaviour of the system, while authorisation 
policies are used to specify which resources or services in the network the user can 
access. Thus, security management policies are required to detail what actions should be 
performed when security violations happen [44].  
2.4.2 Motivation of policy-based systems 
This section justifies the use of a policy-based system. The convergence between wired 
and wireless technologies in 4G heterogeneous networks and the diversity of network 
technologies make network management more complex. It is this increased complexity 
which prompts this research to find an appropriate and adequate solution.  
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Policy-based management systems have become promising for controlling heterogeneous 
networks [46]. There are many reasons for the recent interest in policy-based 
management, including:  
- It supports dynamic changes of system behaviour without the need to stop the 
system [46]. This feature suits heterogeneous network services, which should be 
available at all times without stopping or reconfiguration. 
- It requires less human effort to administer the network. This is an attractive 
characteristic in managing large-scale networks that contain diverse network 
technologies, such as 4G. Therefore, it is important to produce a policy-based 
system that can be cost effective for the end user as well [45].  
- It defines the behaviour of large-scale networks or distributed systems. With the 
rapid increase in the number of network users, a growing number of applications 
and services required by end users have been deployed, creating a need to define 
the rules for using such services and to control the relationships among diverse 
network entities. Hence, it is difficult to build a management system. Policy-
based systems can help to define policy rules and to enforce them en masse [45].  
- It provides better security. As very many network resources are joined in the 
core network of a heterogeneous network, it is essential to protect them from 
abuse. These resources can be abused by authorised users who misuse their 
network privileges. The worst case is when malicious users try to attack the 
network resources [45].  
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 Security policy overview  
Computer security, in general, is defined to include three main objectives of security: 
(1) confidentiality, which is concerned with the disclosure of information; (2) integrity, 
which is concerned with changes of information; and (3) availability, which is 
concerned with denial of access to information [47]. These main objectives are achieved 
through three mechanisms: authentication, access control and audit. Authentication is 
concerned with giving legal users access to resources, whereas access control limits 
what legal users of the system can use in each part of it, to ensure that resources are 
accessed only by authorised users. The access systems are composed of three main 
components: subjects, targets and rules that define which subjects are allowed to access 
the target in specified ways [48, 49]. Figure 2-4 shows the security objectives, 
mechanisms and policy types. 
2.5.1 Security policy types  
This research recognises that the following policies are used as the standard; therefore, 
they will be used as the basis for this study. 
 Authorisation policies 
An authorisation policy specifies what activities a user can or cannot do in the system 
[50]. Authorisation policies which allow a user access are called positive authorisation, 
whereas negative authorisation prevents a user from doing an action to objects of the 
system [45]. Note that the use of positive and negative authorisation policies may cause 
conflicts. However, the policy specification language which is used in this study 
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provides support to solve such conflicts. We explain this kind of conflict and how to 
deal with it in the following chapters.  
 Obligation policies 
An obligation policy specifies what the subject in the system must do if an event 
happens. Thus, predefined events trigger such a security policy to execute actions. This 
is the basis of ECA. The event can be detected with the support of external entities, such 
system agents in the target [45, 51]. Obligation policies have many applications, 
especially for dealing with security violations. When a security violation happens, a set 
of actions are taken to protect the network. This study uses such policies to deal with a 
predefined security violation. The set of actions are based on ITU-T recommendations, 
which will be explained in section 2.6. The policy specification language used in this 
study, Ponder2, supports the application of obligation policies to heterogeneous 
networks. 
 Refrain policies 
Refrain policies are used to prevent subjects from doing a set of activities in the system, 
regardless of whether they have been authorised to do so. They differ from negative 
authorisation policies in one way: they are subject-based, whereas negative 
authorisation policies are target-based [45]. Refrain policies can be used to protect a 
user who has suffered a dangerous attack. This study does not consider refrain policies, 
because dealing with security violations that may affect network objects is beyond its 
scope. 
 Delegation policies 
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Delegation policies define the relations among the subjects of the system, whereby one 
subject grants a set of privileges to another. Delegation policies are associated with 
authorisation policies but are subject-to-subject policies [52]. This research study does 
not consider them. 
 
Figure 2-4. Security objectives, mechanisms and policy types 
 
2.5.2 Access control models 
Many research studies divide access control policies into discretionary and mandatory 
ones. Mandatory policies are responsible for controlling information flow between the 
objects of the system, while discretionary policies specify control of users’ access to 
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objects. Recently, many studies have considered role-based access control policies as an 
alternative to discretionary and mandatory policies [47, 53]. 
2.5.2.1 Discretionary policies  
Discretionary access control policies are responsible for controlling the access of 
subjects to objects of the system, based on their identity or groups. A basic mechanism 
of discretionary access control policy uses an access matrix model. However, a recent 
extension of the access matrix model has been to use positive and negative authorisation 
with it [48]. Negative authorisation defines when access should be denied, and it can be 
used to remove access rights temporarily when a positive authorisation is in place. This 
research uses discretionary negative authorisation to remove the access rights of a user 
whose privileges have been stolen with the purpose of using them to attack the network. 
This will be explained in more detail in the following chapters.  
2.5.2.2 Mandatory policies  
In a mandatory model, access control policies are based on fixed rules mandated by a 
central authority. These access control policies are performed using the Bell-LaPadula 
lattice-based model [47], which deals with issues of data confidentiality; however, such 
policies are not considered in this research.  
2.5.2.3 Role-based access policies 
Role-based access policies (RBAC) follow different ideas from discretionary and 
mandatory policies. In RBAC, permission to access objects of the system is specified in 
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rules which system users are given, so that they can access these object in terms of the 
said rules. RBAC is treated as a separate model in traditional studies such as [54, 55].  
2.5.2.4 Other models 
Additional models have been proposed to be applied in different environments, but this 
research does not consider them in designing and implementing the proposed security 
management system. Examples of other models are non-discretionary policies and the 
Clark-Wilson model.  
 Security management 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on access control and security 
models, but few studies have investigated security management systems, especially 
those used in environments such as heterogeneous networks, where the different 
security levels make designing the system very difficult. The security measures used for 
wired networks might not suit wireless networks. In general, security management is 
considered part of network management and one of the functional areas of the OSI 
management framework; Langsford defines security management as being “not just 
related to using encryption or authentication mechanisms but also including reports of 
any malicious attempts to harm the system” [56]. Hence, the security management 
system is responsible for important issues which detect and deal with security 
violations. Moreover, the security management system is expected to provide a secure 
way to manage the network [57]. Security management is alternatively defined as “the 
translation of the authorisation policies to useful information that can be used as 
security techniques to control access or monitoring of the security activities” [58]. 
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Another important definition, adopted in this study, is that of the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF): security management systems deal with security policies, which are 
concerned with the authentication of users and granting or denying users’ access to 
objects of the system [59]. In the proposed model, the security management system is 
responsible for granting or denying a user’s access if a security violation happens.  
Important aspects of the definitions discussed above, such as detecting a security 
violation and how to deal with it, lead to the conclusion that security policy is based on 
ECA, or obligation policies. Denying access to network resources requires authorisation 
policies. These two kinds of policy, authorisation and obligation, have been considered 
and will be explained further in the next section.  
 Policy specification languages 
Having reviewed the concepts of policy and policy-based systems, this section now 
reviews some policy specification languages currently popular in various domains, such 
as distributed systems, network management, and ubiquitous computing. In particular, 
this section provides justification for using Ponder2 as a tool in this study. 
2.7.1 Ponder 
The Ponder policy language was proposed at Imperial College London as a result of 
research over 10 years. Ponder is a declarative, object-oriented programming language. 
It supports the specification of security policies concerning access control mechanisms, 
such as firewalls, operating systems, and applications [52, 60]. Ponder can be used for 
security management activities and it can deal with security violations. It supports four 
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types of policy: obligation, authorisation, refrain, and delegation. It also supports 
domains which are beneficial for large distributed systems, so it can group objects based 
on their geographical locations, types, or object authorities. Ponder is not considered in 
this research, because the second version, Ponder2, has improved features and provides 
better performance, as explained in later sections. 
2.7.2 PDL 
The policy description language (PDL) is a declarative, expressive language used to 
specify policies. PDL supports obligation policies which take the ECA format [61, 62]. 
The main drawback of this language is that it does not support authorisation policies, 
which means that it cannot be used for security management purposes, especially for the 
current network technologies. Therefore, this policy language will not be used in this 
study. 
2.7.3 XACML 
Extensible access control mark-up language (XACML) is a declarative policy language 
implemented in XML. It is mainly used for access control policies in distributed 
systems [63, 64]. XACML specifies the subject, object, condition, and action in XML 
format. It provides role-based access control, so roles and groups are specified as a set 
of attributes. It has two main components: policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy 
decision point (PDP). These components can be attached to an application or distributed 
systems across the network [65, 66]. Ferraiolo et al. [67] identify two drawbacks of 
XACML. One is that it specifies or enforces policies which are meant for isolated users; 
thus some of the policies required in security management cannot be enforced, such as 
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isolating the authenticated user when security violations happen. The other is that PDP 
in XACML is stateless, which further limits the specification of some policies.  
2.7.4 LaSCO 
The language for security constraint on objects (LaSCO) provides a graphical approach 
to specifying security constraints on objects. In LaSCO, a policy is represented as a 
graph, where objects are depicted as nodes, and events as edges [68, 69]. Although 
LaSCO provides an attractive graphic way to specify policies, it has a few drawbacks 
which make it unsuitable for security management purposes. First, it does not support 
obligation policies, nor can it specify policies for groups of objects. Secondly, it usually 
needs a textual version to specify details which cannot be explained in the graphical 
format. This drawback leads to difficulty in using the language in further restriction 
policies [44].  
2.7.5 Tower 
Tower is a language built to support the specification of role-based access control 
policies. Its basic components include the main structures of role-based access control, 
such as roles, users, and permissions. The language is flexible and supports approaches 
for tracking actions that have been executed based on past events. However, it too has a 
number of drawbacks; for example, it supports only a basic policy specification of 
security management, which makes it unsuitable for advanced and complicated systems. 
Moreover, it does not provide a solution for conflicts between policies, which normally 
happen in large-scale networks [70]. This means that Tower is not an appropriate policy 
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specification language for 4G heterogeneous networks, which are known for their great 
size and complexity.  
2.7.6 Ponder2 
Ponder2 is the second version of Ponder (reviewed above), developed to overcome its 
drawbacks and to facilitate the improvement of systems and networks. Ponder2 is a 
policy system which is appropriate for many environments and applications. It supports 
flexibility and extensibility, and provides interactivity for users to interact with the 
managed system. Its most important feature is that it is able to work with various 
software and hardware components in a wide range of environments, such as local area 
networks, wide area networks, and distributed systems [10, 71].  
According to [72], Ponder2 is implemented as a self-managed cell, which can be any 
hardware or software component that is able to perform the required functions 
automatically. The SMC has a self-management feature and is composed of an 
administrative domain in the managed system. Ponder2 implements the policy-based 
system by treating every part of the managed system as a managed object. Managed 
objects can be anything, including sensors, switches, routers, or end-user devices. The 
concept of managed objects gives Ponder2 the seamless ability to maintain the various 
parts of the managed system and to utilise these components for management purposes.  
Ponder2 supports two kinds of policy: obligation and authorisation. Obligation policies 
in Ponder2 are event triggered, i.e. when events occur they execute action. Such policies 
can be applied for security management purposes, so when a predefined security 
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violation happens, the system executes the appropriate action to handle it. As to 
authorisation policies, these allow or deny interactions between managed objects.  
In addition, an event type in Ponder2 is treated as a managed object. An event type 
specifies that an event can happen at any time, and it designates what information can 
be held with this event in a template. An event is both an instance of an event type and a 
managed object. The event is created by a managed object to hold a message to another 
managed object within the system. The first managed object sends this message, 
depending on a timer or the detection of some condition [10].  
Ponder2 incorporates the concept of domains, which in Ponder2 are managed objects 
consisting of other managed objects. The main purpose of domains is to maintain 
policies more easily, especially in large-scale systems. This is another advantage of 
Ponder2 which makes it suitable for heterogeneous networks. [71] 
Ponder2 is a promising policy system and has proven to be a multiuse language. It has 
been used in various projects in many institutions [72-74], and has been implemented 
on diverse devices such as mobile phones, body sensors, and robots [10]. The various 
research projects that have implemented Ponder2 include e-Health systems consisting of 
on-body wireless sensors [72], and self-management frameworks for unmanned 
autonomous vehicles [75].  
2.7.7 Choosing a policy system  
The previous section reviewed some common policy systems: Ponder, PDL, XACML, 
LaSCO, Tower, and Ponder2. Their different features influenced the choice of an 
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appropriate system for the working environment of this research. The features and 
drawback of each policy have been clearly explained to check their suitability for this 
project as a security management system for 4G heterogeneous networks. Although, as 
discussed before, these policy systems support the main policy types which are needed 
for security management purposes and they are mainly intended to manage large 
distributed systems and networks, those such as Ponder and PDL are not suitable for 
small devices. Ponder2 is different from PDL and Ponder, in that it is more flexible and 
extensible, which suits environments that contain diverse network technologies and 
operating systems. Another difficulty arising from the diversity of technologies used in 
such heterogeneous networks is that it can be difficult to build a policy system for such 
an environment. Thus, Ponder2 provides PonderTalk, a high-level configuration 
language which ensures that the developer of a policy system does not need to know the 
low-level details of the various devices. This ability makes Ponder2 an ideal choice for 
environments which contain a range of small devices and different network 
technologies. Taking account of all the above explanations and analysis, Ponder2 has 
been used to build our system.  
 ITU-T recommendation   
This literature review will now consider a different aspect of this research: ITU-T 
recommendation M.3400. This research recognises the ITU recommendation as a 
guideline on to how to deal with certain malicious events and what actions should be 
taken to protect the network. The ITU recommendation clearly explains that security 
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management should follow a set of procedures after an attack. We specify policies in 
this security management system based on these recommendations. 
As specified by ITU-T, recommendation M.3400 belongs to the 
Telecommunications Management Network (TMN) recommendations, providing the 
security management sets of specifications of the TMN management function. It 
considers security management to be a part of TMN management which cannot be 
isolated from any telecommunication network. Security management includes four 
groups of function sets: prevention, detection, containment, and recovery and security 
administration. Figure 2-5 shows the four TMN management functions. In designing 
our system, we followed the specifications of security management. These contain 
many function sets, but as mentioned previously, we selected those which would help us 
to achieve our security requirements. The following are three function sets which met 
our requirements:  
(1)  The customer security alarm function set, defined as one which “supports access to 
a security alarm that indicates security attacks on their portion of the network”. This 
function set supports detection of security violations in the network.  
(2)  The investigation of theft of service function set, which is defined as one that 
“supports investigation of customer and internal users whose usage 
patterns indicate possible fraud or theft of service”. This function set helps us to 
recognise when mobile equipment is being attacked.  
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(3)  The software intrusion audit function set, which is defined as “a set that supports 
checks for signs of software intrusion in the network”. This third set also helps to 
detect any violation of the network or the mobile equipment.  
These three are detection function sets, and hence contain and recover detected security 
violations. However, M.3400 recommendations also provide containment and recovery 
function sets; for example, the exception report action function set, which supports 
action to limit security breaches and provides some mechanisms, such as isolation of the 
device, to ensure that corruption is not increased or spread to other devices. Another 
function is the ToS action function set, which supports the limiting of security breaches 
by removing the user’s access privileges [15]. We have built our policies on these 
function sets and have defined procedures to be followed if a security violation happens. 
The procedures for dealing with security violations in terms of the policy-based system 
are explained further in the following chapters.  
 
Figure 2-5. TMN Management Functions 
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 Overview of malicious event detection mechanisms  
This section presents the IA detection mechanism. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
the IA works as part of the proposed SMS4HN and is responsible for detecting an 
EUD’s malicious behaviour that may result in compromised privileges or sensitive data 
theft. This research discusses the possible detection techniques, then the appropriate 
technique is chosen.  
As a result of the openness of the Android Applications Store, an EUD may download 
malicious applications. An EUD may also be maliciously attacked when browsing the 
web. To detect malicious applications, the IA needs to understand the normal activity of 
an application. This can be done by creating a normal model of trusted applications. 
When any application in the EUD behaves outside this normal model, it is liable to 
harm the EUD, which may include damaging or stealing data. However, this research 
project focuses on stealing the user’s network resource usage privileges. The user’s 
privileges include the right of the end user to access, modify, or perform functions using 
network resources. These privileges are given to the end user as a part of the 
development of mobile networks, as explained in Chapter 3.  
2.9.1 IA detection mechanism 
Other research studies have proposed many mechanisms by to detect malicious activity 
in smartphones. One mechanism monitors the smartphone battery consumption, such as 
in [2], then creates a normal model of the EUD’s battery consumption, against which it 
can detect abnormal battery usage. This mechanism is inefficient, because the end user 
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may infrequently use benign applications that consume more battery, such as GPS 
applications and games.  
Another mechanism, found in [3], monitors the usage of device resources, such as RAM 
and the CPU. Although this monitoring distinguishes between malicious and normal 
applications, one major drawback of this mechanism is that it has recently experienced a 
high false negative rate when used for smartphones [76].   
Another popular mechanism used by most antivirus software products is to build a large 
database of malware. This antivirus database contains signatures for each malware, 
obtained by analysing the behaviour of the current malwares and detecting raw patterns 
for each. When the antivirus software finds similar signatures, i.e. similar behaviours, in 
an application’s operating system, it identifies this application as malware. Although 
this approach is common for most antiviruses, it has limitations, including the inability 
to detect new malicious activity in the system. 
Other research studies have built anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. This 
approach creates a model of the application’s normal activity in the operating system. It 
starts by monitoring the behaviour of normal applications and creating a model of 
normal behaviour, which allows the IA to detect strange behaviour in the operating 
system. Monitoring this behaviour involves monitoring the system calls requested by 
each application. The system calls in the Linux kernel include service application 
requests from the operating system’s kernel.  
The IA works as an intrusion detection system which is host based, meaning that the IA 
monitors the activities occurring in the Android OS. Therefore, the IA is anomaly 
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based. The IA monitors application activities in the Android OS, collects information, 
and identifies the normal application behaviour. Having created a normal model of the 
Android activities, the IA can detect abnormal activity. If it finds abnormal behaviour, it 
sends a report to the security engine. Section 6.5 explains how to create a normal model 
of application behaviours. 
 Policy-based security management systems 
This section offers a review of related work and some security management techniques. 
The various policy-based systems use different mechanisms to manage the network and 
to provide a secure environment; however, this section reveals the vulnerability of some 
related work, showing that the Y-Comm heterogeneous environment needs an improved 
approach, which is what this study introduces in the following chapters.  
2.10.1 Automatic policy-based systems 
Automatic policy-based systems have been used to manage security policies in the 
network automatically. Burns and colleagues designed and developed a system to 
reduce human involvement in network management [77]. Their system seeks to uphold 
security as the network changes, reconfiguring the network if necessary. They have built 
automatic management systems to help the systems administrators to enforce policies, 
because of the high number of changes in network configurations and the rapid growth 
of network elements, which makes managing the network difficult. The main 
component in their system is a policy engine which validates the policies and generates 
new configuration settings for network elements when policies are violated. However, 
there is a security challenge to this approach: how to prevent illegal users from gaining 
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access to the network after reconfiguration. The system proposed by Burns et al. aims to 
separate policy specification from the recognition of changes in the target network to 
add more automation to the management. An additional component is the management 
console, which is responsible for reporting the current state of the network and storing 
this information in persistent memory. However, this technique is not efficient in an 
environment such as Y-Comm, for many reasons. First, as explained previously, new 
service providers can join the core network in Y-Comm, which makes it difficult to 
install a management console for each network administrated. Moreover, the installing 
of more components will increase the cost of providing the services, which contravenes 
the security requirements of 4G networks, as discussed in section 2.2.  
An extension of this approach is therefore proposed by Lapiotis et al., in the form of a 
security management system focusing on wireless network security issues [78]. They 
present a policy-based system architecture, which includes a central policy engine, 
wireless domain policy managers, and local monitors. The main motivation behind their 
proposal is the widespread use of wireless local area networks, which brings with it a 
heavy increase in security risks, in the form of malicious attacks. This research assumes 
that such attacks may be perpetrated not just by external attackers but from inside, by 
users of the network. Lapiotis et al. adopt the concept of the policy engine as the brain 
of the system, validating policies and generating appropriate configuration settings 
when access policies are breached. The distributed wireless domain policy managers are 
responsible for monitoring and controlling the access points. The third part of the 
system comprises local monitors, which contain intrusion detection modules. Policy is 
enforced in this system by a monitoring and instrument layer, responsible for reporting 
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changes in the network to the policy engine, then receiving and implementing the new 
configuration settings. Figure 2.6 shows the architecture of this system. 
Figure 2-6. Wireless policy-based logical architecture [78] 
The system proposed by Lapiotis et al. provides features such as protecting the network 
from new security threats without relying on the latest security mechanisms. However, 
one question that needs to be asked is whether detection of abnormal traffic is sufficient 
in considering the demand for a highly open network. Because of the high demand for 
highly open heterogeneous networks to provide satisfactory services to end users, such 
as high-speed, anywhere, anytime connection, this security management system is not 
suitable for heterogeneous networks. Another limitation of the proposal is that it 
explains neither what kind of security policies have been enforced, nor the formal 
validation of policies. The present study follows the same approach of a policy engine 
as the brain of the system, but with many modifications. Moreover, separating policy 
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specification from enforcement makes it more dynamic and efficient in an environment 
such as Y-Comm, which contains multi-layered security services. 
2.10.2 Security management system based on IP address and policy zones 
Other researchers have proposed a security management system based on IP addresses 
[79]. Their proposed system is supported by a Spatio-Temporal Role-based Access 
Control model. They divide the network into policy zones, so that policy enforcement 
can be more efficient, according to their conclusions. The main motivation behind their 
work is to address the many changes in dynamic, volatile wireless environments, such 
as increased malicious attacks and a diversity of network elements. The introduction to 
their model of policy zones to represent location, and the role permission given to the 
end user to access network resources are based on these zones. Figure 2.5 shows the 
conceptual framework of the security management system based on policy zones. It has 
six main components: home agent, foreign agent, central authentication & role server, 
local role servers, global policy server, and distributed wireless policy zone controllers. 
The local policy server is responsible for enforcing the policy in each zone. However, 
the need for a server in each zone will increase the cost and complexity of the 
management of large, diverse networks. The concept of dividing the network into policy 
zones is inefficient, because there will be legal network users who access the network 
remotely from outside the controlled policy zones. Another weakness of this approach is 
that it is not scalable to wide networks, or when the current network merges with other 
networks. They assume that the mobile IP is always specific to a host and does not 
change from one location to another, as mentioned in [80]. However, this is not 
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applicable when the network is composed of both wired and wireless technologies, as in 
Y-Comm.  
Hence, the current research proposes a system based on the mobile ID in the service-
level agreement in the core server (Section 2.3). Moreover, we are enforcing policing by 
using current network resources with no need for more network equipment, as explained 
in the next chapter.  
 
Figure 2-7. Wireless security management system [79] 
 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed important topics relevant to this research, whose title 
indicates that it is related to networks, security, and policy-based systems. The chapter 
has: 
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 Introduced mobile networks and outlined their evolution;  
 Given details of the fourth generation of mobile networks, including security and 
other challenges to them;  
 Discussed the Y-Comm framework, with an analysis of its security models.  
 Offered an overview of policies and justified the adoption of a policy-based 
approach to security management systems.  
 Compared policy specification languages, justified the choice of policy language for 
this research project, and offered a critical review of related work.  
 Discussed the ITU-T Recommendation, to explain why this research project follows 
these recommendations. 
The next chapter addresses the structure of Y-Comm and related components, compared 
with our proposed system. Security requirements are also discussed, in line with the 
assumptions made by this research project. The chapter also introduces the 
fundamentals of Ponder2 and considers how this research project can use them. 
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Objectives: 
- Explain the structure of future heterogeneous networks (Y-Comm); 
- Present the security requirements of 4G mobile networks; 
- Present the assumptions made by this research project; 
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 Introduction 
The primary goal of this research project is to meet the security requirements of a 4G 
network. The new architecture of the Y-Comm network is designed to meet the service 
requirements of 4G networks. However, the combination of both wired and wireless 
networks has raised some concerns about quality of service, handover, and security. The 
different security levels and heterogeneously combined networks lead to additional 
security vulnerabilities, motivating the proposal of a novel policy-based security 
management system for the Y-Comm network. There are many different definitions of a 
security management system, but this research chose the definition from ITU-T 
M.3400, as explained in Chapter 2. As the research proposes a new approach to 
protecting the Y-Comm network architecture, this chapter presents a more detailed 
explanation of this architecture. It also introduces the fundamentals of Ponder2, which 
is the policy specification language used in the proposed system. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains the structure of the Y-Comm 
network. Section 3.3 presents the justification of this research project, which considers 
access to users’ information more harmful in the Y-Comm network, leading to further 
attacks. Section 3.4 discusses the security requirements of 4G mobile networks. Section 
3.5 presents the research assumptions. Section 3.6 explains the fundamentals of 
Ponder2. Section 3.7 closes the chapter by discussing policy conflict, a common 
problem in policy-based systems, and a resolution strategy using Ponder2.   
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 Structure of future heterogeneous networks 
Future heterogeneous networks will be owned by multiple operators, who will be able 
to join a core network which allows interoperability between them [81]. ITU-T 
recommends a central management entity that works as a regulatory authority to control 
the whole network [82]. This central management entity has the power to enforce 
policies in the network, and it contains the service-level agreements (SLAs) and 
network-level agreements (NLAs). The Y-Comm network adopts this concept and the 
proposed core-end point to work as an administrative entity that controls the peripheral 
networks [83]. The proposed policy-based system enforces policies in the Y-Comm 
network architecture using this administrative entity.    
Figure 3-1 shows the structure of the Y-Comm network, with the core-end point at the 
top and the peripheral networks at the bottom. (There is an error in Figure 3-1, which 
has been acknowledged by its editors: the label ‘DCA3C’ should read ‘DA3C’.) The 
peripheral networks provide services to end users via an access router (AR). The middle 
level contains the domains, each representing a network operator. The central A3C 
server (CA3C) handles the central authentication, authorisation, accounting, and cost of 
the Y-Comm network. It contains both SLAs and NLAs. SLAs specify the clients’ 
terms of use of the service, while NLAs specify the clients’ terms for accessing the 
network [83]. The AR is the link between the network provider and the EUD. The AR is 
also responsible for enforcing admission control decisions. It acts as an authenticator for 
network users after receiving permission from the CA3C server in the core-end point. 
Other components deal with other issues in the network, such as QoS and handover. 
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Figure 3-1. The core-end point structure with the attached networks [83] 
The proposed SMS4HN interoperates with these components, as explained in later 
chapters.  
 Justification of the danger of access to a user’s identity  
This section addresses a question fundamental to this research: Why does this research 
project consider access to users’ information more harmful in the Y-Comm network? 
User identity theft is becoming increasingly risky in mobile networks, because their 
users participate in ever more activities. Guo et al. [84], who studied smartphone 
security as part of a Microsoft project, explain that smartphone identity theft is 
common. The danger occurs when the attacker behaves like a normal user in the 
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network after stealing a user’s identity. The attacker may then harm the network’s 
resources. This danger reveals the need for a network security solution that detects 
malicious behaviour and takes action to protect network resources. In [85], the 
researchers investigate the security of smartphones and conclude that some malware 
harms not only the device itself, but also other elements of the network. The danger 
increases if the malicious attacker takes full control of the EUD. Therefore, an 
integrated solution with a network security model is necessary. We believe that the 
increase in user privileges on the network due to additional applications makes stealing 
users’ identities more harmful to the network. The attacker who attempts to steal a 
user’s identity may attempt other attacks using this identity [86].  
 Security requirements of 4G mobile networks 
This section reviews the security requirements of 4G mobile networks. The present 
research aims to meet a security requirement that has not been clearly met by existing 
Y-Comm network security models. Furthermore, the proposed SMS4HN is extendable 
to achieve additional security goals.  
Many research studies [5-7] have investigated 4G networks and concluded that any 
future mobile network should meet important security requirements. These may have 
similarities with other fields in wireless networks or distributed systems, but would 
improve users’ involvement in network applications and resources. The Y-Comm 
network architecture should meet all the necessary security requirements to provide a 
secure environment for the user and the network. The security models for the Y-Comm 
network were explained in Chapter 2, where an analysis of the security model was also 
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provided, and where the security vulnerabilities of the Y-Comm network were 
discussed. 
Zheng et al. [7] explain that not considering mobile device security will lead to 
increases in security vulnerabilities within 4G networks. Having investigated the 
security requirements of 4G networks, they conclude that these concern both mobile 
devices and network operators. Five security requirements apply to mobile devices: the 
integrity of the hardware and software of the mobile device should be protected, the 
security system should control access to the mobile device data, the integrity and 
confidentiality of data stored or transported to the network operator should be protected, 
the security system should protect the users’ identities, and the security system should 
prevent mobile devices from being abused and used as attack tools. This last 
requirement is important because of the additional privileges that users have with regard 
to network resources. It has been investigated and met using the proposed security 
management system.  
The security requirements for network operators are explained in detail in [7]. They 
have also been addressed in the Y-Comm network security model, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
 Assumptions 
This section presents the assumptions made in this research project. The Y-Comm 
network is developing rapidly every day and has components that are not yet available 
to the public because of their complexity. Thus, this research makes the following 
assumptions:  
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1- That the components of the Y-Comm network are black boxes.  
2- That the proposed framework will be implemented in the Y-Comm network 
architecture. 
3- That CA3C provides the interface to interoperate the customers’ terms of use for 
a network using an NLA.  
4- That the AR for the Y-Comm network structure is integrated with a policy-based 
system which operates within the management system.  
5- As explained in Section 3.2, that the Y-Comm network follows the ITU-T 
recommendation, which identifies the need for a central administrative entity 
responsible for enforcing policies in an environment that contains a large 
number of objects. 
6- That the proposed system’s components are trusted and able to enforce policies 
in such an environment.  
7- That the IA is scalable and will work with different EUDs.  
8- That these EUDs are allowed to contain software which works as part of the 
network security system. 
9- That the security administrator component of the SMS4HN is automated and 
supports dynamic policies. This component is explained in section 4.4.2.3.  
Figure 3-2 shows how these assumptions lead to the SMS4HN as presented.  
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Figure 3-2. The assumptions of the SMS4HN 
 Problems facing SMS4HN in the Y-Comm environment 
This section discusses the problems that the proposed SMS4HN faces in the Y-Comm 
network environment. These are overcome by applying techniques such as self-
managed cells and managed objects. 
Due to the increasing popularity of 4G mobile networks and the need for high speed 
connections, the Y-Comm network has competed strongly for 4G service requirements, 
including a superfast connection and the network’s availability anywhere at any time.  
The list of problems that SMS4HN faces in Y-Comm are as follows: 
- Convergence of wired and wireless networks: The nature of the Y-Comm 
architecture, which is based on the convergence of existing wired and wireless 
networks, increases the difficulty of implementing a security management 
system to protect the Y-Comm network.  
- The security management systems used in a wired network do not suit 
wireless networks, due to the hosts’ dynamic topology and mobility. 
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- The open nature of Y-Comm allows new network providers to join the core 
network and provide connection services to end users. Thus, the proposed 
SMS4HN creates managed objects to deal with the Y-Comm network 
components, so policies can be easily enforced. These managed objects interact 
with the security engine (the system’s ‘brain’), regardless of the components’ 
configuration details.  
- Different security levels in the Y-Comm network: Allowing for new 
providers to join the network leads to different security levels in the Y-Comm 
network, thus increasing the complexity of the system. This research project 
follows ITU-T Recommendation M.3400, as explained in Chapter 2, to 
overcome the challenge of different security management system definitions. 
This research assumes that the Y-Comm network components provide interfaces that 
interact with the SMS4HN components. This assumption deals with the closed sources 
of the Y-Comm network components.  
Constructively, this research uses Ponder2 to implement the SMS4HN, as it provides a 
concept of managed objects, making the management of the Y-Comm network 
resources achievable, regardless of low-level equipment specifications. However, the 
difficulty for the researcher of learning Ponder2 has increased the time necessary to 
finish this project. This research considers the minimal support for Ponder2 and its 
limited resources to be drawbacks to its use. 
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 Fundamentals of Ponder2 
As Ponder2 has been chosen as the policy specification language for this research, this 
section introduces it and explains its fundamentals.  
Ponder is a policy specification language developed at Imperial College London in 
2001. It includes a number of tools and services for the specification, analysis, and 
enforcement of policies. A large number of subsequent developments and 
improvements have resulted in a new version, Ponder2. The most important 
improvement is the extension of the framework to work not only in general network and 
systems management, but also in diverse embedded devices and most complex 
heterogeneous systems [87, 88].  
Ponder2 is implemented as a self-managed cell, i.e. a representation of a set of hardware 
and software components which forms an administrative domain that functions 
autonomously and is ready for self-management, making everything in Ponder2 a 
managed object. Managed objects are real-world objects, such as routers, switches, 
servers, or alarms that can generate events and interact with other objects for system 
management purposes [10]. This research treats some components of the Y-Comm 
network architecture, such as AR, CA3C, and NLA, as managed objects, so 
management policies are easily enforced. Chapter 5 explains the representation of these 
components and how they interact with the proposed policy-based system. 
The creators of Ponder2 designed it to use managed objects, because they are allowed to 
interact with other software and hardware components in other environments. These 
components range from a single device to large networks and distributed systems [10].  
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The basic objects in Ponder2 are events, policies, and domains. In Ponder2, there are 
two basic policy types: obligation and authorisation. As explained in Chapter 2, 
obligation policies in Ponder2 are triggered by events, so when a managed object 
generates an event, another managed object evaluates this event and executes an action 
if applicable. Authorisation policies in Ponder2 systems allow or deny messages 
between managed objects [10], and when the components of the system are managed 
objects, authorisation policies can be enforced. The subject in this research environment 
is the EUD. This research treats the EUD as a managed object, so the management 
policy-based system is able to deny a specific EUD when necessary.  
PonderTalk is a high-level configuration language that controls and configures the 
Ponder2 system. The managed objects in Ponder2 use PonderTalk to interact [88].  
Ponder2 has four main components: the domain service, obligation policy interpreter, 
command interpreter, and authorisation enforcement. The domain service comprises 
managed objects and their hierarchical structure. The obligation policy interpreter 
manages ECA policies. The command interpreter is responsible for compiling the 
commands from PonderTalk to the managed objects. The authorisation enforcement 
provides a framework to enforce authorisation policies [10, 88].  
The SMS4HN employs the features of Ponder2 to achieve the research goals. As 
previously mentioned, Ponder2 works on heterogeneous networks due to the way the 
managed objects are built. However, the deployment of the SMS4HN faces major 
challenges from the multiplicity of components and layers in the Y-Comm network. An 
explanation of the challenges to research project is presented in Chapter 5. In addition, 
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the time available to work on all the components of the Y-Comm network required 
boundaries to be created for this project. However, these boundaries can be overcome 
due to the simplicity and extensibility of the SMS4HN. These design considerations are 
explained in the next chapter.   
3.7.1 Authorisation policies in Ponder2 
This subsection explains authorisation policies in Ponder2. This research evaluates the 
authorisation policy framework proposed by the Ponder2 creators to achieve the goals 
of the proposed security management system. The Ponder2 authorisation framework 
(PAF) provides a way to enforce authorisation policies that can protect both the subject 
and the target [88].  
Figure 3.3 shows that PAF supports four policy enforcement points (PEPs). PEP1 and 
PEP4 are for the subject, while PEP2 and PEP3 are for the target.   
 
Figure 3-3. PAF framework in Ponder2 [88] 
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For current research purposes, it is possible to enforce authorisation policies on the 
EUD in two PEPs. One PEP prevents the EUD from harming the network, which occurs 
in the current provider AR as PEP1. Also, PEP4 is used to prevent the EUD from 
acquiring a service connection using the core-end point server to remove the user’s 
access. Chapter 5 explains how this research project enforces these policies. 
PAF supports two types of authorisation policy, negative and positive, which may 
conflict for the same subject. This issue and its solution are discussed in Section 3.7.  
3.7.2 Self-managed cell 
This subsection explains the SMC in more detail. As previously mentioned, the SMC 
manages a set of hardware and software components, such as those in large-scale 
network systems. These components interact via links or protocols in the network. The 
SMC contains a set of services that interact using an event bus, which supports the 
event-driven management system requirements [72]. The proposed management system 
is event-driven, and it uses an event bus to transmit events from one managed object to 
another. When an event is transmitted from an EUD in the Y-Comm network 
architecture, the security engine receives this event and makes a decision about what 
action should be taken. Additional details of the proposed system are explained in the 
following chapters.  
The event bus in the SMC has been designed using Ponder2, which allowed the authors 
to achieve several goals. First, the SMC increases the dynamics of the system, because 
the sender of the event does not need to identify its recipient. Thus, the SMC does not 
disturb other managed objects [72]. For example, when a security system enforces a 
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negative authorisation policy based on a detected event, it does not need to disturb the 
other components of the system. Second, the event bus allows many components to 
respond to an event at the same time to achieve different goals, which is necessary in 
the case of the current research, because it allows the proposed security management 
system to respond to a malicious event using several actions. This research considers 
this design an advantage in achieving the security management system’s goals. Finally, 
the event bus can be used to transmit data. However, this research does not consider this 
advantage, because there is no need to transfer application data in the event bus.  
 
Figure 3-4. Self-managed cell architecture [89] 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the SMC’s architecture, showing how the services interact through 
the event bus. These services differ with the system that initiates the SMC. However, 
some components are present in all systems, such as the event bus, a discovery service, 
and a policy service [72, 90]. The proposed security management system has two main 
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components: the policy service and the event bus. The discovery service is not 
considered in this research, because every new mobile device that joins the network 
should use a network-level agreement and is allowed into the network by the core-end 
point CA3C server. Chapter 5 explains the components of the proposed security 
management system in more detail. 
 
Figure 3-5. Policy-based feedback loop [72] 
The SMC’s main feature is its self-management, which is achieved by incorporating a 
basic feedback control loop. Figure 3.5 shows this loop and how the system moves from 
one state to another after an event occurs. Two types of policy are seen to work together 
to achieve the system’s goals: an obligation policy is triggered by an event, then an 
authorisation policy completes the action required by the obligation policy. The events 
are driven by managed objects within the system, and the same or other managed 
objects enforce the policy [72, 89]. This loop has been employed in this research 
environment, and Chapter 5 explains the components that drive the events and the 
components’ actions in more detail. 
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Policies in this basic loop can be enabled and disabled to meet different system goals, 
and these changes can be made without changing the codes for the managed objects 
[72]. The following are basic examples of how the security management system can 
control the behaviour of the components in the Y-Comm network:  
 
This policy is triggered by malicious behaviour in the system and executes the 
appropriate policy. The malicious behaviour is detected by the IA in the EUD. As this 
sample code shows, the EndUserDevice is a managed object. The event is transmitted 
via the event bus and activates or disables a policy. The following policy denies access 
to the EUD using a negative authorisation policy: 
 
The policy service in the event bus supports changes in policies without the need to 
change the codes of the components and without shutting down the system. However, 
an adapter object is needed for each component to perform an action on other 
components [72]. Chapter 5 explains how the components of the proposed security 
management system interact to perform management actions. 
Chapter 3: Preliminaries 
76 
 
 Resolution of policy conflict 
This section reviews policy conflicts and how Ponder2 addresses these. Many research 
studies [91-93] have sought ways to detect and resolve such conflicts. This research 
uses the features of Ponder2 to address this common issue in policy-based systems and 
to resolve it when it occurs in the network. Policy conflicts arise in policy-based 
systems because the environments contain a large number of objects, leading to errors 
or conflicts in the administrators’ requirements. Conflict occurs when there are two 
authorisation policies: one that permits the subject’s activity and another that forbids it. 
When diverse management functions apply different policies to objects of the system, 
Ponder2 provides a strategy to resolve the conflict by dynamically determining which 
takes precedence: when conflict occurs between two policies, precedence is given to the 
more specific policy [94].   
For example, when there is a policy p1 that has a domain conflict with a policy p2 for a 
subdomain, p2 takes precedence, because p2 applies to a subdomain and is thus more 
specific than p1, which applies to a whole domain. Figure 3-6 shows that px is applied 
to a subdomain and pa is applied to a domain. In other words, px is more specific than 
pa. In any conflict between the two, px takes precedence because it is more specific.  
The proposed security management system resolves this conflict using Ponder2’s 
features. The security engine then enforces the appropriate policy.  
This feature of Ponder2 is useful to the proposed SMS4HN and meets the security 
requirement of 4G heterogeneous networks. In addition, this conflict resolution strategy 
works at run-time, which makes it more dynamic. 
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Figure 3-6. Policy conflict resolution in the Y-Comm network structure (adapted from 
[83]) 
 Summary  
This chapter has introduced the structure of the Y-Comm network, which is the 
environment for this research project, including the important levels of the network: the 
core network and the peripheral networks attached to it.  
 The chapter has provided justification for this research project’s assumption that 
access to users’ information is more harmful in this type of network.  
 It has discussed the security requirements of 4G mobile networks.  
 It has explained the assumptions in the proposed security management system and 
built the system based on these assumptions.  
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 It has detailed the fundamentals of Ponder2, which is the policy specification 
language for this research project.  
 It has also explained policy conflict, an important problem that occurs in most 
policy-based systems, and discussed a conflict resolution strategy.  
The next chapter will explain the framework of the proposed security management 
system and each component in the system in detail. It will also discuss the design 
considerations of this research project. 
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Objectives: 
- Present an overview of the SMS4HN framework; 
- Explain the framework architecture; 
- Explain how the framework components interact.  
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 Introduction 
Previous chapters have discussed the complicated research project environment, the Y-
Comm network. The motivation for the proposed security management system and the 
reason for choosing a policy-based approach were also explained. This chapter presents 
an overview of the proposed SMS4HN framework and explains its architecture in detail. 
It also details how the components of the proposed framework interact with the Y-
Comm network architecture. In previous chapters, it was noted that this architecture has 
heterogeneous components, imposing design considerations on this research project 
which are explained in this chapter. It is structured as follows: Section 4.2 defines the 
problem, Section 4.3 presents an overview of the framework and explains the 
components, then Section 4.4 explains the sequence of messages in the proposed 
security management system. 
 Problem definition 
This section explains the Y-Comm network framework problem and why a security 
management system is needed. Because the Y-Comm network is a 4G heterogeneous 
network, it must meet all of the security requirement of 4G mobile networks, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. In particular, the security analysis of the Y-Comm network in 
Chapter 2 showed that one important requirement should be clearly met: a security 
management system is necessary in this environment to detect any security violations 
and handle these using a policy-based system.  
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Smartphones in the Y-Comm network environment have more network resource access 
privileges than in previous generations of mobile networks. Although this is considered 
an improvement to the  service provided to users, an EUD may be attacked or used as an 
attack tool to harm the Y-Comm network. The security management system should be 
aware of this security concern and should propose an appropriate solution. However, the 
convergence of wired and wireless networks makes it difficult to propose a policy-based 
system that works within heterogeneous systems with different security levels. This 
research project considered this difficulty and chose to include tools that would suit the 
Y-Comm environment.   
The research aims to meet the 4G mobile network security requirement which states that 
a security management system must protect end user devices from being used as attack 
tools. This requirement has not yet been met by the security models of the Y-Comm 
network; when an attacker controls an EUD, it can be used as an attack tool, due to 
users’ increased privileges with network resources and applications. The increased 
smartness of phones has caused a concomitant increase in security threats, as explained 
in Chapter 2. This problem motivates this research to develop a solution that protects 
important future heterogeneous networks, such as the Y-Comm network. 
 Framework overview 
This section describes the proposed security management system framework. A 
management layer is proposed at the top of the Y-Comm network architecture. This 
layer works as a security management system to detect predefined security violations in 
the network. It then contains these violations and prevents them from propagating and 
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harming the network as a whole. The security requirements of 4G networks, as 
explained in Chapter 3, state that the EUD should be protected from abuse and should 
prevent an attacked EUD from being used as an attack tool. This requirement has not 
been previously satisfied in the Y-Comm network architecture and needs to be 
addressed, as explained Chapters 2 and 3.  
An attack on the network can occur when an EUD’s user privileges in the network are 
stolen. User privileges are considered sensitive data, as explained in Chapter 3, so 
stealing this sensitive data triggers the security management system. To detect this type 
of security violation, an IA in the EUD is proposed. A full explanation of the IA 
functions is provided in section 4.4.2.1.  
4.3.1 The management layer 
The management layer, located above the security models in the Y-Comm network 
architecture, is a policy-based system that interacts with the main network components. 
Figure 4-1 shows the management layer, which is composed of the security 
management system; this is explained in the next section. 
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Figure 4-1. Management layer of the Y-Comm network framework (adapted from [36])  
4.3.2 The framework 
The main goal of the proposed security management framework is to detect an attack on 
an EUD and prevent it from being used as an attack tool. Thus, the main components of 
the system are an IA, a security engine, a security administrator, and a security database. 
This research proposes an architecture for these components. However, the prototype 
implementation applies only to the security engine, due to the limited time and 
resources available to implement such a large system in the difficult environment of the 
Y-Comm network. Figure 4-2 shows the architecture of the proposed security 
management system. 
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Figure 4-2. The proposed SMS4HN functional diagram 
4.3.2.1 IA 
The IA is a piece of software located in the EUD which works with the security engine 
and warns it when a security violation occurs. The IA was designed to follow the ITU-T 
recommendation M.3400. As explained in Chapter 2, the recommendation suggests a 
function set requiring the security management system to monitor internal users for 
theft of their service, because the purpose of such theft may be to target an EUD and use 
it to attack network resources. This function set meets an important security requirement 
of 4G heterogeneous networks explained in Chapter 3: to protect the network by 
preventing a legal EUD from being used as an attack tool.  
The IA has four main functions: (1) it collects information from the EUD based on the 
security engine’s management policies, (2) it analyses this information and checks for 
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malicious events, (3) it prepares a report and saves changes between previous and newly 
collected information, and (4) it sends the report to the security engine, so that it can 
make a decision and apply the appropriate policy. Figure 4-3 shows the four main 
functions of the IA.  
 
Figure 4-3. The IA’s internal processes 
4.3.2.2 The security engine 
The security engine obtains information from the IA and makes decisions based on this 
information, which can then trigger the security engine to apply predefined security 
policies. The security engine identifies the appropriate policy based on many factors, 
including the type of attack, the type of EUD, possible vulnerabilities in the same node, 
and previous records in the database, then it stores this information in the security 
database for future use.  
An important threat is a malicious attacker’s attempt to access the configuration files to 
steal a user’s privileges and attack the network. We believe that such attacks are able to 
harm the network. Why they are dangerous and how the system can be prepared for 
them was explained in Chapter 3. When the IA detects this kind of attack, it warns the 
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security engine, which isolates the EUD that is being used as an attack tool. The 
isolation of the EUD is based on the exception report action function set, which is part 
of the ITU-T recommendation explained in Chapter 2. The exception report action 
states that the security management system should limit security breaches using security 
tools, such as isolations. This action occurs when two main components of the Y-Comm 
network architecture, the CA3C server, which contains the network-level agreement 
(NLA), and the related access router, interact. When the security engine removes a 
user’s access, that user cannot move or access another network provider within the 
network. However, the user is still connected to the current service provider, which is 
why the security engine needs to interact with the access router to deny access and 
isolate this malicious device.  
4.3.2.3 The security administrator 
The proposed architecture was designed to include a security administrator, which 
discovers inconsistencies in policy statements and specifies new policies when 
applicable. The security administrator can activate and deactivate policies via the shell 
interface, which is part of the Ponder2 framework and supports Ponder2 systems. The 
functionalities of the security administrator, such as discovering inconsistencies in 
policy statements, should be automated for many reasons. First, human network 
management capabilities are unable to match the rapid changes in the Y-Comm 
network’s topology. Second, the security administrator needs to be automated to prevent 
malicious attacks after these changes. Finally, the limitations of static policies are well 
known, and dynamic policies are more efficient and responsive to change [78]. 
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Automated services have not been implemented in the work reported in this thesis, but 
the functions of the security administrator are explained. 
4.3.2.4 The security policies database 
The security database (DB) is part of the SMS4HN framework. It is used to store the 
details of malicious events received from the IA. These details are kept for future 
analysis and improvements in the SMS4HN. The DB is accessed from the security 
engine, and this research study uses the output text file to store malicious event records. 
The next chapter shows how the SMS4HN stores the malicious event records it receives 
from the IA. 
 Sequence of messages in the SMS4HN 
This section explains the sequence of messages and interactions between the 
components of the proposed system with the Y-Comm network architecture. The 
SMS4HN works during either of two cases: normal and dangerous. In a normal case, 
there is no security violation or malicious behaviour in the network (shown in Figure 
4.4). The IA’s analysis shows no malicious behaviour or security violation in the EUD, 
so the security engine does not need to take any action. Conversely, when a security 
violation occurs, the IA sends a report to the security engine, which records the event in 
the database and executes the appropriate policy, as shown in Figure 4.5.  
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Figure 4-4. Sequence diagram of the SMS4HN when there are no security violations 
 
Figure 4-5. Sequence diagram of the SMS4HN during a security violation 
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 Summary 
 This chapter began by defining the problem that this research seeks to solve. It 
explained that the Y-Comm network framework needs a security management 
system that meets the security requirements of a 4G mobile network.  
 It next outlined the proposed framework, giving details of each component. Design 
considerations were also discussed.  
 Finally, the sequence of messages between the SMS4HN components was 
illustrated using sequence diagrams.  
The next chapter explains how this system and its components are implemented, giving 
details of the interactions between the components of the Y-Comm network and those 
of the proposed framework.  
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 Prototype Implementation of 
the SMS4HN 
 
 
Objectives: 
- Describe how the proposed SMS4HN deals with a malicious event; 
- Present the implementation specifications of the proposed SMS4HN; 
- Explain the policy enforcement points in the proposed SMS4HN; 
- Describe the SMS4HN’s response to malicious events; 
- Explain the problems facing the SMS4HN in the Y-Comm network 
environment.  
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 Introduction 
The previous chapter restated the research problem and proposed the SMS4HN for the 
Y-Comm network architecture. It explained the importance of using a policy-based 
approach to meet the security requirements of 4G mobile networks. This chapter 
describes the implementation of the prototype security engine, which is the brain of the 
SMS4HN. It also explains how the SMS4HN works in this heterogeneous environment, 
which is known for its difficulty and complexity, as discussed in Chapter 2. The other 
system components, such as the IA, can be implemented in future work in this field. 
The present research project designs the SMS4HN components and the Y-Comm 
network as managed objects to improve the interactivity and interoperability of the 
SMS4HN components. This research focuses on addressing the challenges of a policy-
based system capable of protecting Y-Comm networks. It offers solutions to the 
challenges of the Y-Comm network environment, so that this security management 
system can be proposed. This chapter discusses the detailed implementation of the 
SMS4HN and shows how the its components interact with those of the Y-Comm 
network. 
One of the challenges facing this research has been the identification of the most 
appropriate of the many policy specification languages available to implement the 
proposed SMS4HN, given the complexity and the difficulty of the Y-Comm network 
environment. This language chosen is Ponder2, because it is flexible and suitable for 
environments containing diverse technologies, such as optical and 3G networks. 
Ponder2 also adopts the concept of a self-managed cell, which supports dynamic policy 
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management for large-scale systems. Chapter 2 provides a detailed explanation of the 
features of Ponder2 and the justification for choosing it. 
This chapter reports implementation of the prototype security engine using Ponder2. 
Section 5.2 explores how the SMS4HN interacts with the Y-Comm network 
components during a malicious event. Section 5.3 presents details of the SMS4HN 
specification, including the obligation and authorisation policy commands, explains the 
mechanism used to solve conflict among Y-Comm network authorisation policies, and 
explains communication between managed objects. Section 5.4 describes the policy 
enforcement points that are used in the proposed policy-based system. Section 5.5 
explains the working of the policy feedback loop, showing the interaction between the 
components of the SMS4HN and the Y-Comm network, and Section 5.6 explains the 
SMS4HN’s response to Y-Comm network events.  
 Response of SMS4HN to a malicious event 
This section illustrates how the SMS4HN components interact during a malicious event. 
The chapter begins with this scenario to provide an overview of the SMS4HN process 
and its interaction with Y-Comm. The scenario assumes that the EUD contains an IA, 
so is able to interact with the security engine. The SMS4HN currently contains an 
events generator to trigger the security engine, but this scenario assumes that there is an 
EUD connected to the 4G heterogeneous network (Y-Comm). This EUD has the 
privileges necessary to access network applications and resources, including the 
privilege to access and modify applications on a peripheral network in the Y-Comm 
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network. These privileges are considered sensitive data and are stored as configuration 
files, such as password files.  
In this scenario, an attacker is trying to steal these privileges to prepare an attack on the 
whole Y-Comm network. In other words, the EUD has become an attack tool in the 
hands of the attacker, who has taken the EUD’s identity for the purpose of conducting 
activities in the user’s name, such as voting or accessing the user’s financial accounts 
[84]. There is a strong possibility that this kind of attack will happen to the Y-Comm 
network, and that it will be more dangerous, due to the additional network privileges 
that the user has on the Y-Comm network, as explained in Chapter 2. The openness and 
heterogeneousness of the network makes it more vulnerable to this type of attack.  
The EUD contains an IA to detect malicious behaviour, and this sends the security 
engine a message containing a mobile equipment identifier (MEID), which is a unique 
number [95]. The MEID was proposed by the 3rd Generation Partner Project to provide 
each mobile device with a new unique global identifier that is stored in it. The IA also 
sends details of the attack type, date, and time to the security engine, which then checks 
to determine if the event meets the conditions necessary for it to be considered 
malicious. Next, the security engine takes action, enforcing the appropriate policies, 
which in this case involves removing the user’s access by modifying the NLA in the 
CA3C of the core network. It also enforces the current AR, which gives the EUD the 
connection to stop providing the service. The enforcement of policies occurs at two 
policy enforcement points, the AR and the CA3C. Once the policies have been 
enforced, the security engine keeps a record in the database for future analysis and for 
the development of new policies. 
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This scenario is presented here to demonstrate how this research has implemented the 
SMS4HN so that it works with the Y-Comm network. The following sections detail the 
specifications of the proposed SMS4HN. 
 SMS4HN specifications 
This section discusses the proposed SMS4HN specification details. The approach of this 
security management system is policy-based, which means that the system acts on 
obligation policies and authorisation policies. Obligation policies are specified in the 
ECA format, so they respond to security violation events. When an event occurs and the 
condition is true, an appropriate policy is applied.  
This research project creates managed objects for the required Y-Comm network 
components so that they interoperate within the proposed system. These managed 
objects, including the EUD, DB, AR, NLA, and the warning managed object, then 
interoperate to achieve the goals of the security management system.   
5.3.1 SMS4HN obligation policies 
This subsection explains how this research project identified the SMS4HN obligation 
policies. Figure 5-1 shows a piece of code that explains how to create an ECA policy 
and how the SMS4HN interacts with the managed objects. In line 1, the system creates 
an ECA policy to check whether there is a security violation detected by the IA and 
received as an event. The system receives the event in line 2, which contains the four 
attributes: EUD ID, attack type, attack date, and attack time. The condition in Ponder2 
is expressed as those in lines 3 and 4. The SMS4HN checks whether the condition is 
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satisfied, then it activates the policy. When the ECA policy is activated, the actions 
comprise four main steps. First, the system keeps a record in the database and sends the 
four attributes to the DB managed object. Second, it interacts with the NLA managed 
object and executes the function that removes the user’s access. It also sends an EUD ID 
to the NLA managed object, as shows in line 7. Third, the system interacts with the AR 
managed object to activate the stopAccess function, which means that it stops providing 
service to this EUD. It also sends the EUD ID. Finally, the system warns the system 
administrator through a warning managed object, as shows in line 9.  
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Figure 5-1. ECA policy in SMS4HN. 
Another piece of code is shown in Figure 5-2, representing the creation of an event that 
is received from the EUD managed object. The system loads the event in the event bus, 
which transmits events between the managed objects, as explained in Chapter 3, so it 
interoperates with the ECA policy. The SMS4HN first creates a template for the event, 
then it defines the attributes of the event, as in line 1. This template is now ready to 
load, as illustrated in Figure 5-2. This step is necessary because it allows the ECA 
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policy to invoke the attributes of the events and check their values when an event 
occurs.   
 
Figure 5-2. Event template of SMS4HN. 
These pieces of code are presented to show how the system employs the features of 
Ponder2 to deal with the Y-Comm network components. Additional details concerning 
the proposed SMS4HN codes are presented in the appendix. 
5.3.2 Authorisation policies in SMS4HN 
This subsection explores how the proposed SMS4HN uses authorisation policies to 
complete the security management tasks. As mentioned in Chapter 2, authorisation 
policies may be either positive or negative. This research uses negative authorisation as 
part of the SMC policy feedback loop, which has two parts: the obligation policy, 
triggered by an event that happens in the EUD, and an action specified by this proposed 
policy-based system, which removes the user’s access, as explained in Section 5.2. In 
other words, a negative authorisation policy should be specified on the EUD. Figure 5-3 
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lists the commands required to specify a negative authorisation policy in the proposed 
SMS4HN. 
 
Figure 5-3. The authorisation policy commands in SMS4HN. 
The commands in Figure 5-3 first create an authorisation policy, then specify the 
subject, which is the EUD. Next, they specify the target, which is the AR. The last three 
commands are to refuse a request received from the EUD, not to reply to this EUD if it 
sends a joining request message, and to activate this policy.  
  
The activation command, repeated above, can be overridden by another command to 
deactivate the policy if the security engine requires this.  
5.3.2.1 Conflict between Y-Comm network authorisation policies 
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This subsection explains how the proposed SMS4HN addresses authorisation policy 
conflicts, a common problem in policy-based systems, as stated in Chapter 3. While the 
conflict resolution strategy in Ponder2 is outlined in Chapter 3, this subsection explains 
this solution in more detail. It also gives the example of a scenario expected in the Y-
Comm network environment, to clarify how the SMS4HN works. 
Conflict between Y-Comm network authorisation policies can occur if a peripheral 
network gives all end users access to network resources, then the security engine 
enforces a negative authorisation policy on an EUD because the IA has detected a 
malicious event. Figure 5-4 illustrates such an abstract conflict. 
 
Figure 5-4. Example of an authorisation policy conflict. 
Figure 5-4 shows that domain C (a peripheral network) gives a positive authorisation to 
all of its nodes. However, node F (an EUD) has a negative SMS4HN authorisation 
Chapter 5: Prototype Implementation of the SMS4HN  
100 
 
policy, which conflicts with the domain-wide positive authorisation. A conflict 
resolution policy is then applied, giving precedence to the policy that is more specific. 
In this case, the negative authorisation applied to the specific EUD (node F) will take 
precedence over the policy specified in domain C. However, this precedence is not 
always given to more specific policies, and a global policy may override a specific 
policy in some situations. Therefore, the command final in Ponder2 guarantees that the 
special authorisation policy will not be overridden.  
Another conflict occurs when two opposing authorisation policies occur simultaneously, 
such as when both a positive and negative authorisation policy apply to a node F at the 
same time. Figure 5.5 illustrates such a conflict. In this case, the conflict resolution 
strategy states that the negative authorisation policy takes precedence over the positive 
one.  
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Figure 5-5. The conflict between two opposite authorisation policies. 
The conflict resolution strategy in Ponder2 fits the present security management 
requirements, due to the design considerations of this language. The features of Ponder2 
are thus suitable for the Y-Comm network environment.  
5.3.3 Communication between managed objects in the SMS4HN  
This subsection explains how the managed objects in this research project communicate 
with each other. They can receive PonderTalk commands via Remote Method 
Invocation (RMI), which specifies how Java objects are accessed to accomplish tasks on 
remote or local machines [96].  
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To send PonderTalk commands via RMI, the proposed SMS4HN needs to start 
PonderTalk inside the SMC. This is done by executing the following two command 
lines: 
 
SMS4HN creates a malicious event template for the EUD, as shown in Figure 5-2. As 
the EUD is represented in this research project as a managed object, the following codes 
are used to send this event to the security engine:  
 
This EUD uses RMI to send the event to the security engine through the following lines 
of code:  
 
The first line aims to contact the security engine using the SMSRMI’s address, then the 
second line sends the values and a message about this event to the security engine. The 
status of this message will be printed in an output file. If there is an error while the 
message is being sent, a warning message will be sent to the security administrator.  
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Another way to send messages between managed objects is via a web service. Although 
this research project does not currently use this method to send messages between 
managed objects in the Y-Comm network, web services can be used in future stages of 
the proposed integration of the SMS4HN into the network. The use of a web service 
may be made necessary by the technologies and large scale of the Y-Comm network. 
The proposed system can be easily modified to support communication using web 
services. Sending messages between managed objects in this way is clearly explained in 
[6]. The appendix to this thesis also contains the code required to send an event from the 
EUD managed object to the security engine using a web service.  
The Java RMI registry must be running on each machine using Ponder2 to start 
communication between managed objects. Thus, this research assumes that each 
managed object represented is running an RMI registry.  
The proposed SMS4HN interacts with the managed objects as if they were local. 
Communication between managed objects is transparent in PonderTalk, which requires 
only two things to send messages to them: a communication medium module and a 
unique reference identifier. The former is the ponder2comms module, and a unique 
reference identifier is assigned to each managed object by Ponder2. 
5.3.4 Dealing with SMS4HN exceptions 
This subsection explains how this research project deals with SMS4HN exceptions. 
Exceptions in Ponder2 are designed to address the errors that may occur while running a 
Ponder2 system. This research uses three main Ponder2 exception objects. First, the 
Ponder2ArgumentException is used if there is something wrong with the argument, 
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such as instances when an argument is missing from an event sent from the EUD to the 
security engine. This exception is also included in case of conversion errors that may 
occur between argument types, such as instances when a string type is expected and 
received as an integer. Second, the Ponder2OperationException is used to address 
errors in methods or operations. Finally, the Ponder2RemoteException is included to 
address communication errors between managed objects. If one of these exceptions is 
thrown, details will be added to the exception, such as the file name and line number.  
5.3.5 Sending messages to managed objects in the SMS4HN 
This section explains how the proposed SMS4HN sends PonderTalk messages to 
managed objects, such the AR and the EUD. This is done via the operation method call, 
as follows: 
 
The first argument in this operation method call identifies the source of the message. In 
our case, it is the EUD that generates the message and sends it to the security engine. 
The second argument is the PonderTalk message, such as at: "eudValue" put: event. The 
third argument in the operation call is the array of P2Objects that contain the values of 
the message arguments, such as the EUD ID, attack type, attack date, and attack time.  
P2Object is the base class for the managed objects in Ponder2. It has been used in this 
research project to create the managed objects, each of which is sent through a 
PonderTalk message as a P2Object. 
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In Ponder2, managed objects do not need to know the protocols required to pass 
messages; they need to know only the class path. Ponder2comms.jar is a module in 
Ponder2 containing protocols that can send messages to and from managed objects. It is 
loaded when the Ponder2 system is started. Thus, when a managed object such as an AR 
sends a message to the security engine, the ponder2comms module will search for, load, 
and use the appropriate protocol module.  
Although only two protocols (RMI and web service) are used in ponder2comms, it can 
support other protocols when the protocol module is written and included in the 
Ponder2 class path. Then the protocol module will be loaded when it is required, 
without the need to change the configuration settings in Ponder2. This ability to send 
messages between managed objects using other protocols is considered an advantage of 
Ponder2. Using other protocols is not necessary at this stage of this PhD project, but it 
may be needed in future stages of the proposed SMS4HN’s deployment. The Y-Comm 
network is expected to contain different network technologies that may require other 
protocol modules to communicate. Lupu et al. used other protocols, such as IEEE 
802.15.4, in their research study [72]. Thus, Ponder2 is able to support other protocols. 
The appendix to this thesis explains how to add a protocol for communication between 
managed objects. 
 SMS4HN policy enforcement points 
As stated in Chapter 3, the authorisation framework in Ponder2 supports two 
authorisation enforcement points. Figure 5-6 shows two policy enforcement points that 
are enforced in the Y-Comm network architecture. The SMS4HN enforces PEP1 at the 
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core-end point, specifically in CA3C, which contains network level agreements. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, these NLAs hold the terms of the user’s access to the network 
services. Therefore, the SMS4HN interacts as a managed object that uses an NLA to 
enforce the policy to remove the user’s access to the Y-Comm network. This policy 
enforcement occurs when security violation is detected that may harm the entire Y-
Comm network, as explained in Chapter 4. However, when the user’s access to CA3C is 
removed, the EUD is still connected to the peripheral network, which is why we need 
another PEP.  
The second PEP is in the access router (AR) and stops the provision of the connection 
to the EUD. The enforced authorisation policies are negative, preventing the subject (the 
EUD) from accessing the target (the Y-Comm network). 
 
Figure 5-6. Policy enforcement points in SMS4HN (adapted from [83]). 
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In this project, PEPs are transparent to the security engine; they are wrapped with a 
piece of code which controls the messages that leave or are transferred to the managed 
object. For instance, the ARs in the Y-Comm network are managed objects and use 
various technologies. The use of wrapping code makes controlling the ARs easier. In 
other words, the security engine does not need to know the details of an AR to enforce 
the policies. The AR is one of the policy enforcement points in this research project, and 
the wrapping code can be used with all managed objects. This research assumes that the 
wrapping code will be implemented for the managed objects when the proposed 
SMS4HN is integrated into the Y-Comm network in the near future.  
The wrapping code can be implemented using the Java Management Extension (JMX). 
JMX was used to wrap the managed objects in [94] because it is a powerful and 
efficient tool for managed objects using various technologies. Thus, the wrapping code 
for the ARs and the other managed objects should be the focus of future work. 
 The policy feedback loop in the SMS4HN 
This section explains the use of the policy feedback loop as a part of a self-managed cell 
in this research project. The SMC with the policy feedback loop is a set of hardware and 
software components that receive an event, then deal with it via a policy. The 
background of the SMC and policy feedback loop is explained in Chapter 3. We also 
mentioned in Chapter 3 that the Y-Comm network components represented in this 
research project are managed objects which can be managed and controlled through a 
Ponder2 system.  
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A managed object, such as an EUD, generates events, which trigger the proposed 
SMS4HN. The SMS4HN analyses these events and applies the appropriate ECA 
obligation policy. An extension of the obligation policy is the authorisation policy, 
which is forced back on the components of the Y-Comm network. This interaction loop 
between the Y-Comm network components and the SMS4HN is called a policy 
feedback loop.  
Figure 5-7 shows the SMS4HN policy feedback loop, which consists of the loop of 
interactions between the Y-Comm network components and the SMS4HN. The first 
managed object in this figure, the EUD, generates an event, which is transmitted to the 
security engine through the event bus. When the security engine receives the event, it 
determines what action should be taken, depending on the attack type; if the event is 
malicious, it takes action based on the obligation policy. The second half of the loop, 
after the action is taken, enforces the authorisation policies on the managed objects, 
such as the AR and the CA3C, in the Y-Comm network. The authorisation policies 
enforce two PEPs on two managed objects: the AR and the CA3C. This loop represents 
the SMC in the SMS4HN. 
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Figure 5-7. SMS4HN policy feedback loop 
 The SMS4HN’s response to events  
This section describes the SMS4HN’s response to events in the Y-Comm network. This 
research project created an event generator to simulate an EUD in order to test the 
security engine’s response to events. The system responds to malicious events generated 
by the event generator and enforces the policy. The SMS4HN interoperates these 
managed objects to achieve the security requirements of the Y-Comm network, such as 
preventing the EUD from being an attack tool. Figure 5-8 is a snapshot of such a 
response.  
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Figure 5-8. Snapshot of SMS4HN after it detects a malicious event. 
Figure 5-8 shows the main steps that the system takes when it detects a malicious event. 
It activates the policy to deny the user’s access and keeps a record with full details of 
the events, so that they can be analysed and used to extend the system in future work. 
The system then creates an output file to store the events that have occurred in the 
network. Figure 5-9 shows the output file of the stored malicious event record. This file, 
listing the EUD ID, attack type, attack date, and attack time, is needed for future 
improvement and for the analysis of the SMS4HN. 
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Figure 5-9. Snapshot of the output file of the malicious events record. 
 Summary 
This chapter has detailed the implementation of the proposed SMS4HN.  
 It began by explaining how the SMS4HN interacts with the Y-Comm network 
components in the case of a malicious event.  
 Next, it set out the implementation specifications of the proposed SMS4HN. It 
explained how this research project has created managed objects and how they 
interoperate to achieve the project’s goals.  
 It then explained how this research implements obligation and authorisation 
policies, followed by an explanation of the mechanism to solve policy conflicts.  
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 It next explored communication among the managed objects and how the SMS4HN 
addresses exceptions and errors. The policy enforcement points in the Y-Comm 
network architecture used by the proposed SMS4HN were then explained.  
 The chapter ended by outlining the response to events in the Y-Comm network.  
The next chapter presents a case study for this research project, details the IA 
mechanisms, and gives an example of the Y-Comm network. 
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 Case Study 
 
 
Objectives: 
- Present a detailed scenario of the detection of a malicious event; 
- Explain the  vertical handover of EUDs in a Y-Comm network, including a case 
study; 
- Give details of the SMS4HN processes in the Y-Comm case study; 
- Explain the IA detection mechanism. 
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 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained SMS4HN implementation in detail. It also discussed the 
way in which this research project employs Ponder2 features when the SMS4HN is 
implemented in a Y-Comm network environment. This chapter presents a case study to 
establish the practical applicability of the proposed SMS4HN, giving details of the 
detection of a malicious event in an EUD. This case study uses the Android OS 4.0 (Ice 
Cream Sandwich) to detect a malicious event, because Android is a popular, open 
source operating system, which received 79% of malware attacks in 2013 [97]. The 
Android application store is an open market, which means that developers are able to 
upload their applications without filtration from any Android market authority. 
Although this is considered an advantage because it increases the number of Android 
applications available, these may call third party applications and encourage EUD 
misuse. These characteristics motivated the use of the Android OS for the proposed IA 
detection mechanism in this research. The IA design hypothesis is also stated, but the 
implementation and evaluation of the IA will be done in a future phase of this research 
project.  
This chapter also shows how an EUD joins another peripheral network in the Y-Comm 
network environment, resulting in a vertical handover. Vertical handover is explained in 
this chapter because it proves the applicability of the SMS4HN to the Y-Comm 
network, which is explained using a case study of three existing networks in Britain.  
Section 6.2 presents the case study scenario, which is explained further in later sections. 
Section 6.3 discusses vertical handover in the Y-Comm network using existing 
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networks. Section 6.4 shows how the proposed SMS4HN works in the Y-Comm 
network case study. Section 6.5 explains the malicious event detection mechanism in 
the EUD.  
 Case study scenario  
This section presents a case study of a Y-Comm network composed of three existing 
networks. The first is the core-end point, in this case the Virgin Fibre Optic (VFO) 
network, which provides high-speed connections and manages peripheral wireless 
networks. The administrative authority for this heterogeneous environment is part of the 
ITU-T recommendation, as explained in Chapter 3. The other peripheral networks 
attached to the core network are the EE4G and Urban WiMax networks. Urban WiMax 
is an internet company that established the WiMax network in 2005. This network 
works in Central London and provides high-speed connections up to 1 Gbps [98]. EE is 
a digital communication company that provides a mobile communication network and 
4G superfast connections for mobile users in Britain. These two networks have different 
network technologies, which the Y-Comm network combines: EE4G uses LTE 
technology, whereas the Urban network uses WiMax technology.  
This research assumes that there is an EUD that operates the Android OS and is 
connected to the Y-Comm network. In the case study scenario, the EUD has been 
attacked in order to launch an attack on the whole network. This kind of attack has 
occurred in GSM networks, and there is a possibility that it may occur in the Y-Comm 
network, as explained in Chapter 5. This assumption is based on the increase in the 
number of privileges granted to EUDs, giving them the authority to access, modify, and 
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manage Urban network resources. Therefore, when these privileges are stolen or 
attacked to target the whole network, the EUD involved must be isolated, to prevent it 
from being used as an attack tool. The prevention and isolation of this EUD is part of 
the ITU-T M.3400 recommendation, as explained in Chapter 2.  
The IA that is part of the proposed SMS4HN is responsible for detecting any malicious 
behaviour. However, many mechanisms and techniques can be used to detect malicious 
EUD behaviour, so the next section of this research presents an appropriate mechanism. 
Once the IA has detected malicious behaviour, it sends a message to the security engine, 
which applies the appropriate ECA obligation policy, then enforces the appropriate 
authorisation policy, as explained in detail in Section 6.4. 
 Vertical handover in the Y-Comm network  
This section gives details of a vertical handover in the Y-Comm network through a case 
study that shows how this handover works in the real world.  
Figure 6-1 shows the Y-Comm network used in the case study. The core network is the 
VFO network, containing the CA3C and CQoSB. The CA3C, as explained in Chapter 3, 
is responsible for authentication, authorisation, accounting, and cost, while the CQoSB 
is responsible for quality of service issues. In this case study, there are two wireless 
technologies (peripheral networks) connected to the VFO network: Urban WiMax and 
EE4G, which are official working technologies in Britain.  
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Figure 6-1. Y-Comm network structure (case study) 
This case study assumes that the end user is an EE customer and that the EUD is already 
connected to the EE network. It then connects to the Urban WiMax network to get a 
high-speed connection. Because Urban WiMax provides high-speed connections in 
specific areas, this vertical handover occurs automatically, so no effort is required from 
the EUD. This is a fundamental feature of the Y-Comm network design.  
When the EUD starts to connect to Urban WiMax (vertical handover from the EE), the 
EUD sends a combined message to the destination network (Urban WiMax). The Urban 
network authenticator, which is responsible for authenticating new EUDs, responds by 
sending an authentication request message to the EUD. In order to receive an 
authentication key to access Urban WiMax, the EUD then sends a message to the EE 
network, with which it is already connected and authenticated. This message is passed 
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from the EE authenticator to the EE DA3C server and then to the VFO CA3C server. 
The CA3C examines the service level agreement for the user’s access to the network. If 
the EUD is allowed to access the Urban network, the CA3C will send a message to the 
Urban WiMax DA3C sever to notify the destination network of this. A message is then 
passed to the Urban WiMax authenticator, which sends a message to the EUD, 
authorising it to use the network.  
Figure 6-2 is the vertical handover sequence diagram for this case study. The 
mechanism illustrated was not designed by this research, but by [6]. It is mentioned here 
to explain the applicability of the proposed SMS4HN to the Y-Comm network 
environment.     
 
Figure 6-2. EUD vertical handover sequence diagram 
All the Y-Comm network components, such as the CA3C and the AR, represent 
managed objects, and the proposed SMS4HN is able to interact with and enforce the 
appropriate policies on them. The next section explains the SMS4HN processes and 
how it interacts with these managed objects.  
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 The SMS4HN in the Y-Comm network 
This section illustrates the applicability of the SMS4HN to the Y-Comm network 
environment using a case study. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the proposed SMS4HN is a 
policy-based system, so a case study will be used to prove that the SMS4HN is able to 
enforce an appropriate policy in the security management system for 4G heterogeneous 
networks. This proposed policy-based system is implemented using Ponder2, and the 
self-managed cell is part of design solution for this Y-Comm network environment. 
This case study assumes that the EUD has the privilege to access, modify, and manage 
network resources on the Urban network. This means that the EUD’s identity is 
important, and that the theft of this identity might harm the network, as explained in 
Chapter 3.  
In the case study, an attacker is trying access sensitive data on the GSM network [84]. 
The attacker can also do this in current Y-Comm networks by executing malware from 
an EUD to conduct malicious activities. The EUD may download this malware from an 
official application store or from the web. (The openness of Y-Comm networks makes 
this kind of attack more likely than on previous networks, as explained in Chapter 2.) 
The IA is responsible for detecting this malicious activity using the mechanism 
presented in Section 6.5. It then sends a report to the security engine including a mobile 
equipment identifier, the attack type, attack date, and attack time. The security engine 
follows the ITU-T recommendation, which states the need to isolate a dangerous EUD, 
and enforces the appropriate policy. In this situation, this is an obligation policy that 
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removes the user’s access when it is triggered by a malicious event. To do this, the 
proposed system has two enforcement points, which are explored in the next subsection. 
6.4.1 Policy enforcement points in the Y-Comm network 
The two policy enforcement points in the Y-Comm network are in the Urban AR and 
the VFO CA3C server. The Urban AR is responsible for authenticating Urban network 
users and stops the EUD from gaining service connections. The security engine removes 
the user’s access in the network-level agreement, which is located in the VFO CA3C. 
Figure 6-3 illustrates the two PEP locations.  
 
Figure 6-3. Location of the policy enforcement points in the Y-Comm network 
architecture 
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The SMS4HN enforces the CA3C, which stops the user’s access to the network. 
However, when the NLA is modified, the EUD may still connect to a peripheral 
network, because it has already received authorisation. Therefore, the second 
enforcement point stops providing the EUD with connection services. Thus, the 
dangerous EUD is isolated. (This isolation was explained in Chapter 2 as a function set 
of the ITU-T M.3400 recommendation concerning dangers to the network.)  
6.4.2 PAF in the Y-Comm network 
The policy authorisation framework is part of the Ponder2 policy specification 
language. Chapter 3 mentions that the PAF in Ponder2 supports two PEPs to prevent the 
subject (the EUD) from harming the target (the Y-Comm network). The second point 
prevents the subject from receiving authorisation to access the target. Figure 6-4 
illustrates the PAF for the SMS4HN in the Y-Comm network.  
 
Figure 6-4. PAF of the Y-Comm network 
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6.4.3 The self-managed cell in the Y-Comm network environment  
The SMC presents the interaction loop between the proposed policy-based system and 
the Y-Comm network components. The SMC concept has been designed by Ponder2 to 
support the dynamic policy-based system, as explained in Chapter 3. In this case study, 
the SMC of the proposed security management system works as a policy feedback loop. 
Figure 6-5 illustrates this loop and the interaction between the managed objects (EUD, 
EE AR, and VFO CA3C) and the proposed SMS4HN.  
This process is called a loop because the interaction starts from a managed object 
(EUD), goes through the SMS4HN to handle the event, then returns to the managed 
object (EE AR, VFO CA3C). The EUD triggers the SMS4HN when the IA detects a 
malicious event, then a message is transferred through the event bus to the security 
engine. The security engine handles this event according to its obligation policies, 
which state that if a specific event occurs, a specific action should be taken. In step 4, as 
Figure 6-5 illustrates, the appropriate authorisation policy is enforced on the managed 
objects represented in the SMS4HN. For example, the VFO CA3C holds the NLA, and 
the EE AR works as an EUD authenticator.   
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Figure 6-5. Policy feedback loop for the SMS4HN in the Y-Comm network 
The complete scenario, from when the IA detects an attack to the last process that 
prevents the EUD from being used as an attack tool, is presented in the case study.  
6.4.4 SMS4HN obligation policies 
This subsection explains how this research project identified the SMS4HN obligation 
policies. Figure 6-6 shows a piece of code that explains how to create an ECA policy 
and how the SMS4HN interacts with the managed objects in the VFO (the Y-Comm 
case study). Figure 6-6 shows that the system creates an ECA policy to check whether 
there is a security violation detected by the IA and received as an event, then it receives 
the event, which contains the four attributes: EUD ID, attack type, attack date, and 
attack time. The SMS4HN interacts with the AR managed object to activate the 
stopAccess function, which means that it stops providing service to this EUD.  
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Figure 6-6. ECA policy in SMS4HN in the VFO network.  
Another piece of code is shown in Figure 6-7, which depicts the creation of an event 
that is received from the EUD-managed object in the VFO network (Y-Comm case 
study). The system loads the event in the event bus, which transmits the events between 
the managed objects.   
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Figure 6-7. Event template of SMS4HN in the VFO network. 
6.4.5 Authorisation policies in SMS4HN 
This subsection explores how the proposed SMS4HN uses authorisation policies in the 
VFO network. Figure 6-8 lists the commands required to specify a negative 
authorisation policy in the proposed SMS4HN in the VFO network. 
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Figure 6-8. Authorisation policy commands in SMS4HN. 
The commands in Figure 6-8 first create an authorisation policy, then specify the 
subject, which is the EUD, and the target, which is the AR.  
6.4.6 Case study results 
This section presents results of an experiment within the case study. The last two 
sections explained the obligation policies and authorisation policies for the Y-Comm in 
the case of the VFO network attached to the EE4G and Urban WiMax networks. In this 
experiment, we created an event generator to simulate the EUD by generating malicious 
events to test the security engine’s response in enforcing the authorisation policies. The 
SMS4HN interoperates these managed objects, which are components of the peripheral 
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and core networks (VFO, EE4G, and Urban WiMax). Figure 6-9 is a snapshot of the 
system as it responds to a malicious event in the case study.  
 
Figure 6-9. Snapshot of SMS4HN after it detects a malicious event. 
Figure 6-9 shows that the system’s main steps after it detects a malicious event are to 
activate the policy to deny the EUD’s access to the peripheral networks (EE4G or Urban 
WiMax), then to deny its access to the core network (VFO) and to keep a detailed 
record of the event. 
This experimental system then created an output file to store the events that had 
occurred in the Y-Comm network. Figure 6-10 shows the output file of the malicious 
event record. 
Chapter 6: Case Study  
128 
 
 
Figure 6-10. Snapshot of the output file of the malicious events records. 
 Detection of a malicious event 
6.5.1 Creating a normal model 
This research has created a normal model of application behaviour, which enables the 
detection of new EUD activities. The IA compares any new EUD activity with the 
normal model and if it finds that the new activity is outside the model, it identifies this 
as malicious behaviour. There are three main steps in the creation of a normal model. 
First, the IA monitors the system calls of the Android OS applications. Next, it applies 
this monitoring task to many EUDs to collect as many application behaviours as 
possible. Finally, it uses a data mining technique to extract useful patterns from the 
collected information. These steps are explained in detail in the following subsections.   
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6.5.1.1 Monitoring the EUD system calls 
The purpose of monitoring system calls is to have an overview of the behaviour of 
applications. The mechanism requires the monitoring of as many applications as 
possible, to maximise the accuracy of the normal model.  
System calls in Android are application service requests from the operating system 
kernel. Android is an operating system based on the Linux kernel. There are 190 system 
calls in the Linux kernel, identified by unique numbers [76]. The analysis of these 
system calls for all applications provides a clear picture of the behaviour of the 
applications.  
To monitor system calls in Android, it is important to understand the sequence of 
components that interact with the application and pass this system call to the kernel. 
First, the application makes a system call request, which is passed to the glibc library, 
comprising a set of functions in the Linux OS, such as open() and read(). After the 
request is passed to the glibc library, it is passed to the system call interface (SCI), 
which is responsible for executing system call requests in the kernel. Figure 6-11 shows 
the components between the applications and the kernel. 
From this explanation, it is evident that the SCI passes all system call requests to the 
kernel. Thus, monitoring all the system calls that are passed through the SCI will show 
the exact behaviour of each application in the Android OS. All system call requests for 
each application are then stored in a file containing significant information, such as 
accessed data, opened files, and the number of system calls, which is sent to a server to 
create a normal model of the application’s behaviour.  
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Monitoring the system calls in Android is similar to the approach used in [76, 99]. This 
case study provides a design solution based on this approach with some modifications 
and extensions.  
 
Figure 6-11. Linux user and kernel space [76] 
6.5.1.2 Crowdsourcing 
This IA detection mechanism monitors as many applications as possible in the Android 
OS, in order to make the normal model as accurate as possible. This can be done in 
cooperation with Google Inc. or by building a database for these behaviours. This 
research assumes that cooperation with Google Inc. is not possible, to prove that there 
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are alternative methods for creating a normal model. One of these involves building a 
database of normal application behaviours from scratch. It is difficult to complete this 
task using a single EUD, so the mechanism presented here uses many EUDs, in a 
process known as crowdsourcing. 
In this context, crowdsourcing means collecting information from many Android 
devices. These EUDs contain software that monitors their normal applications and their 
system calls, then sends the information to a server. The server receives the large 
amount of information that it receives to create a normal model of application 
behaviour. This software has similar functions to that proposed by [76, 100].  
6.5.1.3 Data mining 
The last step of the IA detection mechanism is to extract useful patterns of data from a 
large database of application behaviours. As mentioned in the previous subsection, there 
will be large information files that contain details of Android application behaviour, so 
a method of extracting useful patterns from these large files is needed. Such a method is 
data mining, which uses statistics and the AI to find useful patterns in large datasets. 
The details of a similar approach can be found in [76].  
There are many data mining techniques that can be used to extract useful information 
from a large collection of datasets. A survey of these techniques can be found in [101]. 
This case study suggests the use of k-means clustering, which divides large datasets into 
k groups or clusters, making it appropriate for the proposed IA. In this case study, k = 2 
because two clusters (good and malicious) can explain the behaviour of the application.  
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Thus, the outcome of the above steps is a mechanism for the IA that recognises 
malicious behaviour. At the end of these three main steps, the IA will be able to 
compare any new activity with the normal model. Figure 6-12 shows the three main 
steps involved in creating a normal model.  
 
Figure 6-12. Main steps for creating a normal model of application behaviours 
 Summary 
This chapter has presented a case study of Y-Comm with details of the mechanisms 
required to apply the proposed SMS4HN in the real word.  
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 It has explained vertical handover in the Y-Comm network using a case study, then 
given details of the proposed SMS4HN processes for the case study.  
 It has explained the detection mechanism in detail. The steps followed by the IA 
include the creation of a normal model of application behaviours. 
The next chapter evaluates the proposed SMS4HN and discusses the limitations of the 
research.   
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 Evaluation of the Security 
Management System for 4G 
Heterogeneous Networks 
 
Objectives: 
 Evaluate the proposed SMS4HN using several criteria; 
 Discuss the limitations of the SMS4HN.  
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 Introduction 
So far, this thesis has set out the background, framework and implementation details of 
the security management system for the Y-Comm network. This chapter evaluates the 
proposed SMS4HN, in order to ensure that it will work in the Y-Comm network 
environment. A second goal is to compare the SMS4HN with related work. This chapter 
explains that the SMS4HN is a novel security management system for the Y-Comm 
network. The proposed SMS4HN is evaluated and compared with other security 
management systems, based on the following success criteria:  
- The extensibility of the SMS4HN; 
- The ability to modify the behaviour of the policy-based system while it is 
running; 
- The self-management of the system; 
- Its interoperability with the heterogeneous components of the Y-Comm network; 
- Its scalability. 
These criteria are used to compare the SMS4HN with the security management systems 
discussed in Chapter 2. The security management system in [78] is referred to as 
PWLSMS, and that in [79] as MIWSMS. The authors of the PWLSMS sought to build a 
system that would validate policy and generate new settings when the policy was 
violated in the network. They also built a local monitor for each area in the network, 
responsible for authenticating EUDs and enforcing policies. The MIWSMS differs in 
that it divides the network into policy zones. Its authors conclude that policy 
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enforcement is thus more efficient. Each policy zone includes a local server that is 
responsible for enforcing the policy. Chapter 2 explains their approaches and 
mechanisms in detail. This chapter evaluates the SMS4HN and compares it to the 
PWLSMS and the MIWSMS in terms of several criteria. 
Section 7.2 evaluates the extensibility of the SMS4HN against these criteria. The 
SMS4HN’s modifiability is discussed in Section 7.3, then Section 7.4 considers the self-
management of the proposed system. Its interoperability with the Y-Comm network 
components is discussed in Section 7.5, while Section 7.6 discusses its scalability.  
  Extensibility 
An important aspect of any security management system is its extensibility. Such a 
system can be extended in three ways: responding to additional malicious events, 
enforcing policies without additional hardware, and using additional communication 
protocols [45]. This section evaluates the extensibility of the SMS4HN in comparison to 
other security management systems. It was necessary to include this evaluation criterion 
in this project because the Y-Comm network is continuing to increase in size and 
because it enables new peripheral network providers to join the core network, as 
explained in Chapters 2 and 3. 
7.2.1 The ability to respond to additional malicious events 
The first dimension of extensibility to be addressed is the ability to respond to 
additional malicious events, which security management systems for heterogeneous 
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networks are expected to do. When an effective security management system detects an 
EUD performing functions that that it is not permitted to perform, this violation is called 
vertical privilege escalation. To prevent this type of violation, which is likely to harm 
the network resources and associated data, the security management system is expected 
to enforce a negative authorisation policy on the EUD. 
The MIWSMS shows limited extensibility in this scenario. There are two procedures  
required to enforce a policy on an EUD that violates the access control rules and tries to 
escalate its privileges in a network. The MIWSMS specifies PRi <rj, Zi, Objk, T, d>, a 
policy rule which states that rj (the policy rule) has specified that the EUD has been 
denied access to Objk (for example, the AR) in zone Zi (the policy zone, for example, in 
the EE’s peripheral network) during time interval T (for example, from 12/8/2014 to 
30/11/2014). The implementation rule for this policy is the following: IRx < Ui, rj, 
Servk, Zi, T, d, neti>. Under this rule, the user Ui (EUD) is denied access to the network 
service Servk (for example, the connection service of Y-Comm) in zone Zi during time 
T, and neti (for example, the CA3C in Y-Comm). Due to its large scale and the 
necessity of sharing connection services between peripheral networks, it is difficult to 
divide the Y-Comm network into policy zones. Therefore, these procedures are not 
suitable for the Y-Comm network, because they require the identification of the EUD 
zone. These rules are also difficult to implement, making them inefficient for large-scale 
networks.   
The SMS4HN responds to vertical privilege escalation with a specific policy that 
controls the managed objects. It specifies one obligation policy, and when the condition 
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in this policy is met, the negative authorisation policy is enforced on the EUD to 
prevent vertical privilege escalation. The following code snippet creates a template for 
the privilege escalation event in the SMS4HN. It also loads the EUD managed object, 
giving it a vertical privilege escalation type. This piece of code is reproduced here to 
explain that the SMS4HN is able to define the vertical privilege escalation event and 
respond to this event. 
 
Figure 7-1. The commands used to create a template for the vertical privilege escalation 
of an event. 
The piece of code in Figure 7-1 can be dynamically loaded into the SMS4HN, and after 
the new event type is loaded into the system, it is able to target and respond to this 
event.  
The following code snippet specifies how the SMS4HN responds to the privilege 
escalation event.  
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Figure 7-2. The commands used to specify the negative authorisation policy for an EUD. 
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Based on the above piece of code, the SMS4HN loads the event, checks whether it 
meets the policy condition, then performs the policy action, enforcing a negative 
authorisation policy on the EUD that has performed a vertical privilege escalation. 
These examples show that the SMS4HN has better extensibility than other security 
management systems. This superior extensibility is the result of two factors: it is easy to 
control the Y-Comm network components because they are already designed as 
managed objects, and the SMS4HN has the self-management ability to handle an event 
and enforce a policy on managed objects.   
The SMS4HN responds to a vertical privilege escalation in line with the ITU-T 
Recommendation M.3400, which has a function set that administers the external access 
control function set. This function set supports the security management system, 
allowing it to control what the user can do to any given resource and validating the 
user’s permissions and credentials [102].  
7.2.2 The ability to enforce policies without additional hardware 
The second facet of extensibility is the ability to enforce policies without additional 
hardware. The PWLSMS is a security management system for both wired and wireless 
networks, whose designers sought to protect these networks from misuse by their users. 
According to them, this policy-based system is extensible because it adapts to new types 
of network equipment. The key architecture design is a local monitor, designed to sniff 
the data traffic and detect malicious behaviour. However, it should be asked how the 
system builds local monitors for a wide area network. Building many local monitors is 
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costly in time and resources. The added financial cost of providing such a service 
increases costs for end users in turn, but this violates the 4G requirement, discussed in 
Chapter 2, for a low-cost service. 
The proposed SMS4HN, by contrast, achieves its security management goals without 
incorporating additional hardware. It interacts with the Y-Comm network components 
and sends messages to these existing components. The ability to achieve the security 
management system goals in a Y-Comm network without additional hardware is a 
strength of the SMS4HN. 
7.2.3 The ability to communicate among managed objects using 
additional communication protocols 
The third aspect of extensibility is the ability to communicate among managed objects 
using additional communication protocols. The policy-based system in a dynamic 
environment must be extensible in that the many communication protocols which 
support various technologies are themselves supported. This is important because 
different network technologies may require different protocols, such as IEEE 802.11, 
for the components to communicate.  The local monitor in the PWLSMS communicates 
with the policy engine through XML messages [78]. However, there is no mention of 
whether the system supports other communication protocols.  
Unlike the PWLSMS, the SMS4HN is able to use additional communication protocols, 
meaning that it has better extensibility than the PWLSMS.  
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In conclusion, the SMS4HN is able to respond to additional malicious events, whereas 
the MIWSMS has limited extensibility in its response to additional malicious events. In 
addition, the SMS4HN outperforms the PWLSMS in its ability to enforce policies 
without additional hardware and to use multiple communication protocols.     
 Modifiability 
An important aspect of security management systems for mobile networks is 
modifiability, meaning the ability to modify the behaviour of a policy-based system 
during its run time without affecting other network services. For example, there should 
be no need to restart or recompile the system. This section evaluates the modifiability of 
the SMS4HN in comparison with the PWLSMS [78], assessing their respective ability 
to modify their behaviour without the need to restart or recompile the system. This 
research uses modifiability as an evaluation and comparison criterion because the Y-
Comm network environment is expected to provide connection services at any time 
without affecting other services, which is the one of the 4G requirements explained in 
Chapter 2. 
The PWLSMS uses XSB Prolog to implement its policy-based system, and the system 
must be restarted in order to activate or deactivate a policy. Conversely, policies 
implemented in Ponder2 can be added and removed without editing the component 
codes and specifications. Figure 7.3 provides an example of how the SMS4HN modifies 
its behaviour.  
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Figure 7-3. Activation and deactivation policies in SMS4HN. 
Based on the above piece of code, each policy can be activated or deactivated easily 
with a one-line command, even after the policy has been specified. Therefore, a 
modification is achieved in SMS4HN without requiring the system to stop or recompile.  
 Self-management 
Reducing human effort requirements for managing networks is an important 
consideration in policy-based systems, because they are expected to be self-managed 
and should respond instantly to malicious events without waiting for human input. This 
section evaluates the SMS4HN and compares it to the PWLSMS in terms of self-
management ability. This was considered an evaluation criterion because Y-Comm is a 
large-scale network needing a policy-based system with low human effort requirements, 
thus reducing the cost of managing the network, as explained in Chapter 2.     
The PWLSMS separates policy specification from policy management, which makes 
the policies robust. Although this feature is required for policy-based systems to 
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accommodate changes in network topology, this mechanism has a major drawback with 
regard to the detection of malicious activity by the policy engine. The local monitor in 
the PWLSMS’s proposed architecture is responsible for monitoring all activities in the 
host and network equipment, but it does not monitor EUD activities. Therefore, when 
the policy engine is responsible for detection, the efficiency of malicious behaviour 
detection is reduced, because such behaviour can occur in different parts of the network, 
including in the EUD. In addition, the mechanism that detects malicious behaviour uses 
data traffic analysis, which may be misled or fail to detect real malicious behaviour.   
The proposed SMS4HN improves the efficiency of detection by separating 
responsibility for it from the security engine. The IA detection mechanism depends on a 
deeper analysis of the malicious activities that occur in EUDs. Thus, malicious 
behaviour can be detected and reported to the security engine instantly, enabling it to 
enforce the appropriate policy. In addition, this research implements the SMS4HN as an 
SMC, as explained in Chapter 5. The SMC provides a loop of interaction that starts at 
the EUD, moves through the SMS4HN, which responds to this event, and ends with the 
enforcement of policies using Y-Comm network components, such as the AR and 
CA3C.  
The use of managed objects in the SMS4HN also has several advantages. First, the 
system is able to manipulate them in the same way for management purposes. Second, 
when managed objects are specifically designed for Y-Comm network components, this 
increases their reusability for other purposes in the security management system. Third, 
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managed objects are transparent in the SMS4HN, which enables them to be controlled, 
regardless of their low-level specification details.   
The PWLSMS uses XML to configure the policy system for a wireless networks’ 
security management system, which has two major drawbacks. First, XML is hard to 
debug and read. Second, large pieces of code are needed to decode the XML messages 
received by a managed object [10].  
The proposed SMS4HN uses PonderTalk to control the managed objects, as explained 
in Chapter 5. PonderTalk has been proposed by [10, 103] to overcome the drawbacks 
associated with XML and to provide a high-level language to control and configure the 
Ponder2 system. It allows messages to be sent to managed objects so that they can be 
controlled. PonderTalk ensures that the SMS4HN does not need to know the low-level 
details of various devices. This ability makes the SMS4HN suitable for Y-Comm 
network environments that contain a range of small devices and different network 
technologies. 
 Interoperability 
Another important factor which this research considers is the SMS4HN’s ability to 
work with the heterogeneous components of the Y-Comm network. It is important to 
control and send messages to the components, enabling the secure management of the 
Y-Comm network. Interoperability has been considered in this section because the Y-
Comm network contains several heterogeneous components. Therefore, the Y-Comm 
network requires a security management system that is able to work and enforce 
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policies in a heterogeneous environment. This section evaluates the SMS4HN and 
compares it to the PWLSMS’s ability to work with heterogeneous components.  
The SMS4HN is designed to work with heterogeneous components as managed objects, 
which are wrapped in a piece of code that is used to interpret the messages they receive 
from other managed objects. These messages hold task commands, such as removing a 
user’s access. Thus, interoperability between the managed objects that are components 
of the Y-Comm network and the SMS4HN is improved.   
The PWLSMS uses XSB Prolog to program its policy engine. Its designers argue that 
Prolog supports well founded semantics. However, it has several drawbacks. For 
example, some Prolog compilers do not support the modules [104]. In addition, 
portability across real-world systems is a problem in Prolog [105]. Finally, [106] 
evaluated the performance of Prolog and found it to have more performance issues than 
other programming languages.   
Based on the above discussion, the SMS4HN is seen to have better interoperability than 
the PWLSMS.  
 Scalability 
An final important attribute of policy-based systems for large-scale networks is their 
scalability. According to Strassner [45], there are three types of scalability in policy-
based systems: “(1) the ability to add capacity to existing resources, such as adding 
memory”; “(2) the ability to add additional network components, such as servers,” and 
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in our case, the ability to add a new peripheral network to the Y-Comm network; and 
“(3) the ability to add logical processing power.” In this research, scalability is taken as 
the ability of the proposed system to add a new peripheral network and new EUDs. 
Scalability was considered in this evaluation because the Y-Comm network has a 
constantly growing number of EUDs joining the network. This section evaluates the 
proposed SMS4HN’s scalability and compares it with that of the MIWSMS [79].  
A significant scalability limitation of the MIWSMS is that the crucial design requires a 
Policy Zone Controller located in the Local Role Server. The MIWSMS architecture 
divides the network into zones to enforce its policies. This design has a high cost and is 
inefficient for large-scale networks, requiring many servers and additional network 
resources. In addition, the MIWSMS is impossible to extend to and work on the Y-
Comm network. The local monitors are also connected to WDPMans, which is a 
module that holds the policy engine via a wired interface, because it is more secure 
against DoS attacks, but this does not support the scalability of the policy-based system, 
because large-scale wireless networks use additional secure protocols to communicate 
between the components.  
The SMS4HN uses an event bus, which allows it to separate the services into the 
event’s sender and recipient. Thus, new event creators do not disturb the behaviour of 
the SMS4HN. For example, when new EUDs join the Y-Comm network, which allows 
these EUDs to send events to the security engine, the engine is able to receive these 
events without stopping the system. Therefore, using the event bus in the SMS4HN 
increases the successful scalability of the proposed system.  
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 Limitations of the SMS4HN 
This section discusses the function-related limitations of the SMS4HN as presented. No 
evaluation of the SMS4HN’s performance was conducted, because it was not integrated 
into the Y-Comm network. When integration is completed, accurate performance 
measurement will be possible, and the SMS4HN’s response time to malicious events 
can be measured more accurately. In addition, once integration is completed, the 
wrapping codes for the AR, CA3C, and NLA managed objects responsible for 
interpreting PonderTalk messages will be added to the Y-Comm.   
A recovery method for an isolated EUD to use the Y-Comm network after isolation was 
not proposed in this framework. The solution to this recovery problem is proposed for 
future work.  
The SMS4HN is a large system that requires significant effort for its integration into the 
Y-Comm network. Therefore, additional research on the Y-Comm network architecture 
is required to deploy and apply it in the real world, which constitutes a limitation of the 
present study. Future work in cooperation with Y-Comm network research studies is 
proposed to overcome the limitations of the SMS4HN. 
 Summary 
This chapter has discussed and evaluated the proposed SMS4HN using several criteria.  
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 First, the extensibility of the SMS4HN was compared to two other security 
management systems: the PWLSMS and the MIWSMS. 
 Next, this chapter evaluated the modifiability of the proposed policy-based system.  
 The self-management of the SMS4HN was then discussed and compared with other 
security management systems.  
 There was then an evaluation of the interoperability of the SMS4HN’s components 
in the Y-Comm network.  
 The scalability of the SMS4HN was discussed next. 
 The final section addressed some limitations of the system.  
The next chapter concludes this research study and presents plans for future research 
work on the proposed security management system.  
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 Conclusion and Future 
Work 
 
 
 
 
 
Objectives: 
- Present a summary of the thesis; 
- Present the main contributions of the thesis; 
- Describe intended future work on this research project. 
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 Summary of the thesis 
This thesis began by presenting the background to the study, including the evolution of 
mobile networks, then discussed the challenges to mobile computing, specifically a 
number of security issues. Next, it explained 4G mobile networks and heterogeneous 
networks, analysed the security of the Y-Comm network, and provided an overview of 
security policy types and access control models. Definitions of security management 
were given, then policy specification languages and their strengths and weaknesses were 
discussed. The choice of Ponder2 was explained and justified, and similar policy-based 
security management systems were discussed. Chapter 2 ended with an explanation of 
why this research study followed the ITU-T recommendations to build the proposed 
security management system. 
Chapter 3 then explained the structure of future heterogeneous networks and provided a 
justification for the assumption of this research that theft of a user’s identity is a 
dangerous violation that may lead to further attacks on the Y-Comm network itself. The 
unmet security requirements of 4G mobile networks were discussed next and the 
assumptions made in this research were stated. It was then important to present the 
fundamentals of Ponder2. 
Chapter 4 established the framework for the new security management system and 
discussed details of its components. The framework is located on the top layer of the Y-
Comm network and works as a management layer. 
The specifications for the prototype implementation in the security engine were 
presented in Chapter 5. It described fundamental concepts, such the policy feedback 
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loop, which shows the interaction between the proposed system and the Y-Comm 
network’s components, and the conflict resolution strategy, which is used for 
authorisation policy conflicts in the Y-Comm network. It was then explained how 
messages can be sent to managed objects using PonderTalk, and how the SMS4HN 
handles exceptions and errors using Ponder2 exception objects, such as 
Ponder2ArgumentException. 
Chapter 6 reported a case study using the Y-Comm network that combined real, existing 
networks. This showed how an EUD moves from one peripheral network to another and 
discussed the role of the SMS4HN in the Y-Comm case study. The IA’s detection 
mechanism, which is an anomaly-based approach that detects malicious activity in the 
Android operating system, was then explained.  
Finally, Chapter 7 evaluated the proposed system and compared it to other policy-based 
security management systems against a set of criteria, chosen because they demonstrate 
that the SMS4HN is suitable for the Y-Comm network environment. These were 
extensibility, modifiability, interoperability, self-management, and scalability. 
 Success criteria 
The thesis has answered the research questions presented in Chapter 1. It has presented 
a framework for the SMS4HN that works in the Y-Comm network’s heterogeneous 
environment, enforces policies in that environment, and interoperates with its 
components. The proposed SMS4HN has been shown to fulfil the following success 
criteria: 
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- The SMS4HN interoperates with the Y-Comm network components, which are 
treated as managed objects. It sends messages to them using PonderTalk to 
enforce the appropriate policies when a malicious event occurs.  
- The SMS4HN is extensible and is able to respond to additional malicious events 
and to enforce policies without the need for additional hardware, whereas other 
security management systems for wired and wireless networks need additional 
hardware components.  
- The SMS4HN is self-managed and applies the policy feedback loop concept in 
the Y-Comm network. The loop is composed of two parts: obligation and 
authorisation policies.  
- The modifiability of the presented policy-based system demonstrates its ability 
to activate and deactivate policies to change the behaviour of the system without 
requiring other system services to stop.   
 Contributions  
The main contribution of this thesis is to propose and justify a novel security 
management system suitable for the Y-Comm network. The thesis has demonstrated its 
ability to work in the Y-Comm environment, as explained in Chapter 2. The 
contributions of this research study include: 
- A new approach to protecting Y-Comm networks. 
The proposed approach prevented an EUD from being used as an attack tool in 
the Y-Comm environment. It followed ITU-T recommendation M.3400 to deal 
with the security violations in the network. 
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- A policy-based framework for the Y-Comm network. The purpose of this 
framework is to enforce policies in the Y-Comm network, a new architecture 
with heterogeneous components, which makes security management 
challenging. Thus, the network needs a novel framework that can respond to 
malicious events. The SMS4HN meets the security needs of the Y-Comm’s 
design and is able to meet the criteria defined in Chapter 1. 
- A self-managed cell for the Y-Comm network to interact with managed 
objects. The self-managed cell is represented as a policy feedback loop, which is 
triggered by the EUD and transmits an event to the security engine, then acts to 
enforce the appropriate policies.  
- A novel IA mechanism to detect malicious behaviour in an EUD. The 
mechanism presented explained how to detect malicious behaviour in the EUD. 
The novelty of this mechanism is that the IA in the EUD interacts with the 
security engine in the CAS3C, thus providing better security for the Y-Comm 
environment.  
 Future work 
The researcher aims to continue working on the SMS4HN so that it can be integrated 
into the Y-Comm network architecture in the future. Future work on the SMS4HN is 
expected to be conducted in cooperation with researchers from other institutions.  
This future work includes the implementation of the IA in the EUD. The work will start 
using the Android operating system, and it will then move on to other common 
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smartphone operating systems. To make the system more efficient, the IA may generate 
a unique number for each EUD, which will be used as an identification number.  
Another aim of future work is to write wrapping codes for components of the Y-Comm 
network, so they are able to interpret PonderTalk messages and complete tasks for 
security management purposes. 
This research study aims in future to propose a mechanism that gives isolated EUDs 
their privileges back. This mechanism can be created to allow the SMS4HN to work in 
the Y-Comm network. Hence, this research will follow the ITU-T recommendations in 
the design of this mechanism.  
This research study also aims to analyse the output file, which contains a record of the 
malicious events that have been detected. This analysis would be beneficial to update 
the security policies when new attacks occur in the Y-Comm network. 
Finally, the study will propose a mechanism to evaluate the time it takes for the 
SMS4HN to respond to malicious events. This part of the evaluation will provide 
accurate measurements after it is integrated into the Y-Comm network architecture in 
the future.  
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Appendix 
In this appendix, some of the techniques necessary for the integration of the proposed 
SMS4HN into the Y-Comm network, such as sending messages to the managed objects 
using a web service, will be discussed. In addition, how other communication protocols 
are used to send messages to the managed objects in the SMS4HN will be explained. 
Then instructions on how to write and execute new policies in the SMS4HN will be 
provided along with an example of the process. Next, the technique for writing a 
managed object and the mapping from PonderTalk to the managed objects will be 
explained. Finally, instructions for the installation of Ponder2 and how to run the 
proposed SMS4HN will be provided.  
A.1 Sending messages to managed objects using a web service 
Chapter 5 mentioned that managed objects can communicate with each other in 
different ways and explained how they communicate using Java RMI. This section of 
the appendix shows how two managed objects (hardware or software) communicate 
using web service over the Y-Comm network. The following code example can be used 
to send an event from an EUD managed object to the security engine using a web 
service.   
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This example shows the SMS4HN’s ability to enable communication between managed 
objects using a different method from Java RMI, and it provides an example of the 
proper code for future enhancements to the SMS4HN.  
A.2 Using other communication protocols with the SMS4HN 
This research explained how the managed objects within the SMS4HN communicate 
using Java RMI. Section A.1 identified how messages can be sent to the managed 
objects using a web service. However, the Y-Comm network contains network 
technologies that may require other communication protocols. Thus, this section 
explains how to use a protocol that is not supported by ponder2comms.jar.  
Ponder2 allows other protocols to be added to the SMS4HN, so the managed objects 
can communicate with each other. However, to add another protocol, a new protocol 
module should be written [88] and included as a jar file in the Ponder2 classpath. Once 
the module is added to the classpath, the module can be loaded when it is needed. The 
Ponder2 system does not require any other configurations or changes, which is an 
advantage of Ponder2.  
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A.3 Writing a new policy for the SMS4HN 
In the future, the SMS4HN may require a new policy, so this section explains how to 
add a new policy for vertical privilege escalation, which occurs when an EUD performs 
an action it is not permitted to perform. As explained in Chapter 7, this action must be 
prevented. The policy states that whenever an EUD is detected performing actions that 
are not permitted, a negative authorisation policy should be enforced on the EUD. The 
steps to add a vertical privilege escalation policy are as follows:  
- Create a file with a .p2 extension in the top directory of the SMS4HN folder; 
- Run the SMS4HN using an ant command; 
- Executed the newly created file using ant [the new created file]. 
-  
When the policy is executed and running, it has the ability to respond to the vertical 
privilege escalation. The next section explains in detail how to write the obligation 
policy for the vertical privilege escalation violation.  
A.4 Writing a vertical privilege escalation policy 
To write an obligation policy in Ponder2, an event template must be created and loaded 
into the event bus. When a predefined event occurs, the SMC triggers the obligation 
policy for that event. The specified policy checks the conditions and executes a 
predefined action. The event template for the vertical privilege escalation requires the 
following commands:  
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 These commands are then loaded into the event template in the event bus, so when the 
vertical privilege escalation event is detected by the SMC, the policy for the predefined 
event is applied. A vertical privilege escalation policy should be created using the 
Ponder2 command:  
 
Then it should define the policy event using the following command:  
 
The condition should be checked using the following Ponder2 command: 
 
It should then specify the obligation policy actions, which requires the following 
commands: 
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Finally, a record of the event is saved in the database, and a negative authorisation 
policy is enforced on EUD that violated the vertical privilege escalation. 
A.5 Writing a managed object 
This section briefly explains how to create managed objects in the SMS4HN. The 
managed objects in Ponder2 receive and send PonderTalk messages, but the managed 
objects should be written in Java. A managed object in Ponder2 is annotated with 
PonderTalk bindings, such as @Ponder2op(), so it is able to receive PonderTalk 
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messages and perform the required actions. The @Ponder2op() annotation is located on 
the top of the method and contains the PonderTalk message name [88].  
To write a managed object, the compiler must be told that it is a managed object. Do 
this using the following command:  
class AccessRouter implements ManagedObject { 
A constructor bound to PonderTalk is needed so the Ponder2 factors recognise the 
required call when it initiates the object. To do this, the following Ponder2op command 
is used:  
//* Creates an instance of this object 
  */ 
@Ponder2op("create") 
public AccessRouter () { 
} 
In the previous command, the factory message create is used to create the object.  
@Ponder2op("stopAccess:") 
public AccessRouter (int eudID) { 
} 
 
In the previous command, the factory message stopAccess is used for a specific task in 
an access router managed object, and stopAccess receives the eudID (The EUD ID).  
When PonderTalk commands are created for use in the SMS4HN, a Java method with 
the appropriate annotation and arguments is created. This step requires the following 
command: 
@Ponder2op("PonderTalk_command") 
public void method(args) { 
} 
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PonderTalk_command is the name of the command PonderTalk sends. The number of 
arguments sent should match the arguments specified in the method.  
A.6 PonderTalk method mapping 
The mapping from PonderTalk commands to Java is explained in this section. There are 
three types of PonderTalk commands: unary, binary, and multiple arguments 
commands. 
The following is a unary PonderTalk command example: 
Java PonderTalk 
@Ponder2op(“setWarning”) 
public void warnAdmin() { 
} 
root/warning setWarning. 
 
A binary command has only one argument, and an example of a binary command is as 
follows: 
Java PonderTalk 
@Ponder2op(“removeAccess”) 
public void removeEUDaccess(String 
eduID) { 
} 
root/NLA removeAccess: eudID . 
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A multiple PonderTalk command contains multiple arguments separated by a ‘:’. The 
following is a mapping example: 
Java PonderTalk 
@Ponder2op(“eudID:AttackType:Date:Ti
me”) 
public void keepRecordinDB( int 
eudID, String AttackType, String 
AttackDate, String AttackTime) 
root/DB keepRecord: eudID, 
AttackType, Date, Time. 
A.7 Ponder2 installation 
This section explains how to install the Ponder2 system to run the SMS4HN. The only 
requirement for running the Ponder2 system is Java 1.5. The operating system used in 
this explanation is the Linux (Ubuntu) OS. Also, this research used Ponder2 version 
2.3623. The steps to install Ponder2 are: 
- Download the Ponder2 package from the following link: http://ponder2.net/cgi-
bin/moin.cgi/Ponder2Downloads; 
- Extract and unzip the files, and run the Ubuntu shell [103];  
- Change the directory using the following command: cd ponder2/p2src; 
- Enter the following command to install Ponder2:  - ant install  
The response from the Ubuntu system will be: 
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Figure A.8-1. Ubuntu response after Ponder2 system installation 
A.8 Running the SMS4HN 
To run the SMS4HN, Ponder2 must be installed. The steps to run the SMS4HN are as 
follows:   
- Change the directory using the following command: cd SecMangSys; 
- Enter the following command: ant -Dboot=SMS5.p2.  
Ubuntu will respond as follows: 
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Figure A.8-2. Ubuntu response after running the SMS4HN 
 
